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The Original Public Understanding of Privileges or
Immunities
James J. Ward
[This soldier] desires to have his supper at your eating house, and as
your house is a public one, it is expected at these headquarters that no
distinction be made on account of color or race. If this soldier does not
receive his meal, and is not treated in the same manner as any of your
customers . . . your establishment will be closed . . . .1
Unoffending citizens, in the pursuit of their private business, are
rudely interfered with, and their houses closed, because they did not
choose to admit negroes to their table upon the same footing as white
men.2

I. A TEXTUAL ORPHAN
The Constitution tells us more about who we are as a people
than its scant four thousand words would suggest. Its structure
shows what the Framing generation wanted from government, and
what they feared from it. The Amendments help chronicle the
beginnings of the great democratization, the Radical moment in the
1860s and 70s, the Progressive moment, and the Executive crises of
the mid-twentieth century. The document and its interpretation also
tell us about who we are by illustrating the paths we chose not to
follow, or perhaps the paths that were closed off from us.

 Associate, King & Spalding LLP. I wish to thank Laura Rawski and Alexis Zouhary
for their input. I am particularly grateful to Fred Gedicks for his invaluable contributions and
insight during the drafting of this article. A.M.D.G.
1. Negro Equality—An Outrage upon the Rights of Citizens, THE MEM. DAILY
AVALANCHE, Feb. 2, 1866 (page 1). This source, and other newspaper sources from the late
1800s which are cited in this Article were retrieved from the Database of America’s Historical
Newspapers, available at http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news
(username and password required), and at various educational institutions around the country.
Where the original sources did not include page numbers, the page number on which the cited
material may be found in the database is indicated in the parenthetical following the date of the
article.
2. Id. The author proceeds to cite the Third Amendment to the Constitution and
remarks, with unintentional irony, “Such an instrument [the Constitution] was believed to
exist, but we have heard little of it lately.” Id.
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After the end of the Civil War, Americans began to consider
questions besides who would defeat Robert E. Lee. The convulsive
effect of the Rebellion reached all aspects of American life, and the
law was no exception. The entire legal superstructure that developed
around African bondage, its badges, and its incidents was either to
be destroyed or reconciled to the views of the victorious Union.
Slavery, of course, would have to be abolished, but much more
remained doubtful or at least questionable. Would the federal
government be supreme over the states? Would blacks ascend to full
participation in civil society? Would the South remain under
occupation forever, with freedmen’s rights secured only by the
armies of bluecoats in her midst? The answers to these questions
were not clear in the immediate aftermath of the struggle.
Soon,
though,
Andrew
Johnson’s
management
of
Reconstruction would falter, and the Republican majorities in
Congress would place their stamp on constitutional history without
him. In a period of dizzying governmental activity, the Radical
Republicans enacted sweeping reform—including the first Civil
Rights Acts, the establishment of agencies for their implementation,
and three constitutional amendments.3 Among these, the Fourteenth
Amendment was the clearest effort by Republicans to define the new
order of government, and to re-orient individuals and states in their
relationship to Washington.
The standard interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment—as
understood by the Supreme Court and most legal scholars—is that
the Due Process4 and Equal Protection Clauses5 represent sources of
modern liberty.6 Most believe that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause7 had no radical or substantive effect at the time of passage,
but instead reflected a traditional baseline of rights. Others suggest
that the Privileges Clause might have had meaning, but, like a mute
Lazarus, its resurrection would make no difference because courts
3. See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 34–46 (1986)
(providing historical background for the Civil War Amendments).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3 (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
5. Id. cl. 4 (“nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”).
6. Entire law school courses are taught about the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”).
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would interpret the Clause to the same effect as the other Clauses in
Section 1.8
These standard approaches—like many rules of thumb—are ideas
that almost make sense. Unfortunately, because they are so reliant on
law office history, misconceptions, and false dichotomies they ought
to have fallen into disuse. One might conceive of a system in which
the Constitution may be parsed to find those portions that are
important (presumably the Commerce Clause) and those that are
not (presumably the Congressional Adjournment Clause), but we
cannot presume its authors to have written superfluous Clauses that
ratifiers understood to be irrelevant. Consequently, if there is an
appropriate and discernible reading of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, we should seek it with zeal.
Some believed that McDonald v. City of Chicago9 presented the
best opportunity to reexamine the Clause in generations. Chicago’s
severe restrictions on personal firearm ownership were challenged as
a violation of both the Due Process and Privileges or Immunities
Clauses.10 Although both parties and several amici extensively briefed
the Privileges or Immunities arguments,11 the McDonald plurality
opted to follow the more traditional route and incorporate the
Second Amendment against the states.12 Justice Thomas concurred
that the Second Amendment applies to states, but grounded his
opinion in the belief that “the right to keep and bear arms is
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as a privilege of American
citizenship.”13 His opinion—discussed in greater length below—
squarely rejects the traditional approach embraced by the plurality

8. See Jess Bravin, Rethinking Original Intent, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2009, at A12
(quoting former Solicitor General Paul Clement and Professor Laurence Tribe as both
believing that the reinvigoration of the Privileges or Immunities Clause would accomplish little
more than moving the presently accepted Due Process rights to a different clause); see also
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3029–30 (2010) (discussing scholarly debate
over the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but deciding against reconsidering
the traditional interpretation).
9. 130 S. Ct. 3020.
10. See id. at 3027.
11. See Petitioners’ Brief, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No.
08-1521), 2009 WL 4378912; Brief of Amicus Curiae Institute for Justice, McDonald v. City
of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 4099506.
12. The decision rested upon the holding in District of Columbia v. Heller, which
explained that the Second Amendment expresses a right to personal firearm ownership outside
of any service in the militia. 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008).
13. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3088 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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and the dissenters and argues that the Court’s jurisprudence has long
neglected the appropriate reading of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Thomas examined Reconstruction-era documents to discern
an original public understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
textual guarantor of personal liberty was the Privileges or Immunities
Clause—not the Due Process Clause.14 While Justice Thomas’s
approach is a faithful account of the contemporary public’s
understanding of the Amendment when it was ratified, I suggest that
it leaves out important elements of the national discussion and is
therefore somewhat incomplete. Despite McDonald’s promise, then,
there is a persistent gap in the originalist study of the most important
Civil War Amendment.
Subject to the caveat that history is never certain, I suggest that
the Fourteenth Amendment, as originally understood, ensured
equitable governance in three ways. First, it required states to treat
all citizens equally and ensure that they were not denied the
privileges or immunities of the citizenry. Citizens were entitled to
the protections of the first eight Amendments to the Constitution as
well as certain citizenship rights. These citizenship rights were the
fundamental tenets of Republican political theory, particularly
Radical and abolitionist Republican theory that aimed at ensuring
full civil and political participation in the state.
Second, states had to adjudicate fairly and in keeping with the
privileges and immunities of the people, and not take actions that
violate due process of law or the “law of the land.”15 Finally, states
must provide all persons equal protection of the law—executing the
laws in a manner that does not deprive any person of the law’s
uniform effect. Sections 3 and 4 were punitive,16 and Section 5 does
precisely what it says: enforces the foregoing powers, but does not
grant Congress substantive rights-defining authority.17 While

14. Id. at 3071–83.
15. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process:
Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585,
594 (2009).
16. For a description of the various clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
subsequent effect of its provisions, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 349–
402 (2005).
17. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (explaining that Congress’s
power under Section 5 is not substantive, but rather “congruent” and “proportional” to the
ills to be remedied).

448

DO NOT DELETE

445

5/3/2011 1:14 PM

Privileges or Immunities

Congress may have prophylactic authority, such matters are beyond
the scope of my argument.
The latter concepts are uncontroversial; the first requires
significant explanation. Put briefly, we have had the Fourteenth
Amendment all wrong, and we have had it very wrong indeed. The
Privileges or Immunities Clause (“Privileges Clause”) embodied the
substance of the Amendment, and its public understanding at the
time of its ratification should control our application of it today. To
that end, I have examined speeches, public statements, letters to the
editor, newspaper articles, party platforms, and addresses at rallies in
an attempt to gain insight into the public understanding of the
Amendment in contemporary context.
The sources reveal a vigorous debate with no certain answer, but
such historical indeterminacy should be unsurprising. Nevertheless,
three schools of thought emerge. The first, or “narrow view,”
embraces limited federal power and resurgent states’ rights theory.
The second, or “consensus view,” demanded equal treatment of
citizens by states and established a baseline of rights enforceable
against trespassing state governments. Finally, the “radical view”
went well beyond consensus and imagined an egalitarian society with
muscular federal involvement in personal liberties.
Though there is no unquestioned winner in the struggle between
these theories, I have not named one of them the “consensus view”
without reason. In short, the sources strongly suggest that those in
power in the United States and a very large segment of the
population understood the Privileges Clause to incorporate the Bill
of Rights and to convey a modicum of political rights. This
conclusion comports with Justice Thomas’s concurrence, but with
significant points of divergence.
In Part II, I examine the traditional approach to the Privileges
Clause as well as modern revisionist interpretations. The former is
the standard tale against which I argue; the latter is a far better
account that I suggest should itself be revised. In Part III, I examine
the sources themselves and demonstrate how they form the three
views of the Amendment and the Privileges Clause. Part IV considers
the arguments put forth in McDonald and examines the implications
of my interpretation. Part V concludes.
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II. TRADITION AND REVISION
A. Fairman and Berger’s Conventional Story
The Fourteenth Amendment underwent its first significant
historical examination by Charles Fairman in 1949.18 Fairman sought
to answer whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill
of Rights against the states, and the piece came at a propitious
moment, given the recent debates in Adamson v. California.19
Fairman’s article begins by discussing the Privileges Clause and its
interpretation.20 For Fairman, the story of privileges or immunities is
best explained by examining privileges and immunities. He rightly
notes that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment “repeatedly
quoted in the debates of 1866” certain authorities on the Privileges
Clause.21 The first of these sources, Corfield v. Coryell,22 was
mentioned in the floor debates, in contemporary newspapers, and in
the courts. Like so many of those contemporaries, Fairman focuses
on Justice Washington’s list of what are “strictly speaking, privileges
and immunities.”23 The (somewhat lengthy) explanation of what
constitutes privileges and immunities does not impress Fairman, who
explains how Justice Washington was “badly confused” in Corfield.24
As euphonious as a list of fundamental rights may be, the appropriate
inquiry into Article IV, Section 2 is confined to a limited range of
rights.
Did [Washington] mean merely that of the rights being enjoyed by
Marylanders, the visitor was entitled not to all . . . but only to the

18. Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2
STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
19. 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (holding that the Bill of Rights is not incorporated against the
states).
20. Fairman, supra note 18, at 9–11.
21. Id. at 9.
22. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
23. Id. at 552 (listing the right of a “citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in
any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim
the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the
courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an
exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state;
may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are
clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to which
may be added, the elective franchise”).
24. Fairman, supra note 18, at 11.
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general range of really essential rights such as one found established
throughout America? If this was the thought, then the
enumeration gives an idea of which among the rights locally
accorded are “fundamental” in maintaining the “mutual
friendship” among the people of the different states . . . .25

Fairman describes the recitation of rights as “unguarded,” as though
Justice Washington were over-eager in his demonstration of his
affection for the Constitution.26 Moreover, he suggests that the
Justice could not have meant to imply that all American citizens have
the same privileges as citizens in the other states.
[An out of state] visitor was entitled to engage in “professional
pursuits.” But think of the profession with which Justice
Washington was best acquainted: certainly the attorney could not
come in and practice without admission to the local bar—and did
the Justice really mean that the state might not make state
citizenship a requisite to admission? The list even included “the
elective franchise, as regulated and established” by the local law.
But surely, participation in Maryland’s elections was even more
intimately an affair for only Marylanders . . . .27

All of this “confusing”28 analysis vanishes away under the weight of
Justice Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution.29 Fairman
introduces the venerable work as though it would part the clouds of
historiographical darkness: “There was no ambiguity in Story’s
Commentaries.”30 Story’s work all but resolves the matter: the
Comity Clause was an antidiscrimination measure designed to ensure
the most basic of liberties.31
The problem with this analysis is Fairman’s creation of a false
dichotomy between extensive privileges and immunities and the

25. Id.
26. Id. And, indeed, perhaps he was. Politicians in the latter part of the nineteenth
century were unabashedly effusive in their love for the Constitution and its seemingly divine
origins. See, e.g., infra note 79 (explaining Thad Stevens’ somewhat messianic view of the
document).
27. Fairman, supra note 18, at 11.
28. When Fairman encountered statements that contradicted his thesis he often asserted
that the speaker was confused: there were eight separate times he referred to persons as being
confused. Id. at 11, 12, 31, 35, 45, 54, 106, 137.
29. 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES § 1806 (4th ed. 1873), quoted in Fairman, supra note
18, at 12.
30. Fairman, supra note 18, at 12.
31. Id.
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police power—a false dichotomy that will reappear throughout the
discussions of the Privileges Clause.32 As his discussion of Corfield
makes clear, Fairman thinks it implausible that the Constitution
would mandate that all states permit non-citizens to vote. Yet there
is no need to read the Comity Clause as vesting all rights of state
citizenship in non-citizens. The language of the Clause itself does
not so require; it simply mandates that states provide the same
treatment to all persons. A reasonable reading of Article IV is that
the Guarantee Clause imposes limits on the form of state
government (an internal limit), and the Comity Clause limits the
manner in which that government may treat outsiders (an external
limit designed to avoid interstate strife). In any event, the Clause
certainly does not eliminate the police power, which would have
included the right to set qualifications for office or voting. Fairman’s
view requires one to ignore the fact that states did not permit every
citizen to vote or practice medicine. That is, even if states had to give
outsiders all the same privileges as citizens, those privileges were not
unrestrained to the point of anarchy.
Yet having carefully built and dressed his straw man, Fairman
proceeds to demolish him. His analysis of the Fourteenth
Amendment depends almost wholly on the Comity Clause, and he
opens Part III of his article with Senator Lyman Trumbull’s views on
privileges and immunities, which he thought would permeate the
Civil Rights Act.33 He sets out these arguments34 and then cites three
Democrats who opposed the Act on the grounds that it was “one of
the most dangerous that was ever introduced into the Senate of the

32. It certainly reappears throughout his work. See generally id.
33. Id. at 15–18.
34. Again, he does so with a somewhat breathtaking lack of equanimity. His
parentheticals (complete with exclamation points) and his somewhat fawning treatment of
opponents of the consensus or Radical views of the Fourteenth Amendment hinder his
argument. See id. at 18 (noting that “Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, Democrat, made
a number of lawyer’s points against the bill—a task for which he was outstandingly qualified”).
John Bingham—one of the most respected lawyers in the United States at the time—is never
credited with making “lawyer’s points.” Later, during the debates, John Bingham stated that
the Fourteenth Amendment would counter those state constitutions having in them provisions
“in direct violation of every principle of our Constitution.” Id. at 29–32; see also CURTIS, supra
note 3, at 95. Fairman (rather churlishly) remarks that, “[o]f course a state law could hardly
violate every principle of the Constitution.” Fairman, supra note 18, at 32. This is both
obviously correct and obviously beside the point.
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United States.”35 He sets out the story of the ratification, but with
their imperfect understanding of the Comity Clause, Fairman
believes that the ratifiers simply got it wrong.36 His piece has been
thoroughly critiqued elsewhere and need not occupy us further. It is
simply worthwhile to note that the “traditional story” is Fairman’s,
and his work deserves the same exacting eye—if not tone—that he
directed towards the 39th Congress.37
If Fairman’s partisan tract is the Legal Process School foundation
of the modern approach to Privileges or Immunities, Raoul Berger’s
Government by Judiciary is the logical—if delayed—response of the
more cynical and skeptical 1970s.38 Fairman and Berger did not
accept that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges Clause conveyed
significant political rights—such as the right to vote, the right to
participate in juries, or the right to run for office—or that it made
the Bill of Rights enforceable against the states.39 Again, they are not
necessarily wrong, but a refusal even to examine the opposing

35. Fairman, supra note 18, at 18 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 476
(1865–66).
36. As Fairman put it, “It is not our responsibility here to find answers to the questions
that needed to be answered in 1866. It is enough that we, with the wisdom of eighty years’
hindsight, have made our own analysis and have discovered the underlying issues. As we pursue
the debates in Congress it will often be apparent that a speaker had a very imperfect awareness
of the essential difficulty. We shall in each case be watching on two levels—to understand his
conceptions, and then to refer those conceptions to the inescapable logic of the problem.” Id.
at 24.
37. The grave error Fairman commits is one common to legal historians—hindsight
bias. Fairman believed that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Bill of Rights,
and so he impugned any contemporary who thought that it might. Fairman later went out of
his way to argue against the incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states, but then
suggests that selective incorporation was, in fact, the appropriate outcome. See id. at 134–39;
see also CURTIS, supra note 3, at 117–18.
38. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
39. This is a point to which Berger repeatedly returned during his career, albeit with the
same restricted, one-sided historical examination. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Ronald Dworkin’s
The Moral Reading of the Constitution: A Critique, 72 IND. L.J. 1099, 1103–11 (1997)
(reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996)) (criticizing Dworkin for failing to abide by the premise that “history
is crucial” in Dworkin’s analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment, but proceeding to ignore
contradictory sources himself); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: Akhil Amar’s
Wishing Well, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 14–28 (1993) (discussing the “limited scope” of the
Fourteenth Amendment in general and of the Privileges Clause in particular); Raoul Berger,
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Michael Curtis’ Response, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 7–
16 (1983) (asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Bill of Rights).
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documents casts doubt on their arguments.40 For example, Berger
takes as a given that Section 1 does not permit blacks to vote, and he
relies on the words of Senators and Representatives to support his
position.41 Yet dozens of other speeches, letters, and declarations
provide support for precisely that notion, and the contemporary
documents support it.42 A simple examination of those sources, even
in an effort to undermine them, would dramatically strengthen
Berger’s argument; without discussing them, Berger transforms from
historian into polemicist. Moreover, he engages in the same sort of
sniping at the drafters and ratifiers as Fairman, undoing any claim to
neutrality.43 And while Berger properly explained that noted
historians praised his works, he continuously mistakes prestige for
authority and assumes that approbation is the same as
confirmation.44 Berger asks his readers to rely on his incomplete
historical inquiry, which is little better than an ipse dixit.
Moreover—though this anticipates Part III—if the Radical
Republicans were wrong, and the Fourteenth Amendment did not
allow Congress to protect privileges and immunities, the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 would have probably been facially unconstitutional. The

40. Some are far more critical of Berger’s work. Bruce Ackerman wrote that he was
“troubled by Berger’s use of italics to suggest that Washington is emphasizing the limited
character of his construction of ‘privileges and immunities’—when in the excised portion of the
text he explicitly endorses a more expansive interpretation. This kind of shoddy work on a
source as crucial as Corfield is inexcusable.” BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 335 n.21
(1991). This, for Ackerman, was bad historical research and writing. “By ‘bad,’ [Ackerman]
mean[s] really bad.” Id. at 334. Berger was unflinching in his response and his criticism of
Ackerman’s book, but his attempt to rehabilitate his historiography still falls somewhat flat; his
focus is still on exclusively elite sources, and his argument is essentially one about original
intent. See Raoul Berger, Bruce Ackerman on Interpretation: A Critique, 1992 BYU L. REV.
1035, 1043–50 (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE FOUNDATIONS (1991))
(citing judges, Senators, Representatives, and legal scholars to support his proposed view of the
original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment).
41. See Berger, supra note 40, at 1046–50; see also BERGER, supra note 38, at 54–68.
42. See infra Part III.
43. As Curtis discusses, the language related to John Bingham in Berger’s Government
by Judiciary is somewhat less than flattering. Bingham was “muddled” and “inept.” CURTIS,
supra note 3, at 120 (quoting BERGER, supra note 38, at 145, 219). Curtis suggests that
Berger’s point was to “subject[] [Bingham] to personal attacks . . . . [and] prove that Bingham
was a legal moron.” Id.
44. Berger, as always, was blunt: “My Government by Judiciary won praise from Willard
Hurst, Philip Kurland, Forrest McDonald, and C. Vann Woodward, scholars of higher stature
than Curtis and Nelson. What sort of scholarship is it that prefers the testimony of a tyro like
Curtis to that of renowned scholars?” Berger, supra note 40, at 1050 (internal citations
omitted).
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Act, replete with provisions related to public accommodations and
certainly based on the consensus or even Radical view of Section 1,45
passed a Congress where the Radicals were no longer the majority.
Neither Berger nor Fairman explain this apparent anomaly. Their
understanding is shaped by a misperception of Article IV, Section 2,
so they cannot provide an adequate explanation for contemporary
legislation that contradicts their argument.
Even if one accepts the Fairman view of the Comity Clause, it is
entirely inaccurate to say that the same legal theories animated the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although textually similar, the Clauses
serve different purposes in different times; and to conflate them is to
understate or ignore the political dynamism of the Reconstruction
era.46 It makes even less sense to assume that the Privileges Clause
was intended or understood to convey those rights “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,” as Fairman suggested.47 Such an
approach raises the question “what privileges or immunities are
implicit in ordered liberty?”48 while consigning the Privileges Clause
to a dead letter.49 For Fairman, that approach permitted him to
assert that “selective incorporation” was the only proper
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment—a premise he slips
into his article’s last paragraphs, and it is an obvious nod to his
collaborator and friend, Justice Frankfurter.50
45. See Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (“[A]ll persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of
the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land
or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and
limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless
of any previous condition of servitude.”).
46. See generally Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: Some Countercriticism, 56 TEX.
L. REV. 1125 (1978) (tying the Privileges Clause to Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities
Clause without differentiating the political circumstances at the time of their relative
enactments). Berger simply assumes that a “privilege” meant the same thing in 1787 as it did
in 1867, which is a faulty proposition when it is unaccompanied by primary sources to
substantiate it. Id.
47. Fairman, supra note 18, at 139 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. I suggest that the sources below indicate that the Bill of Rights lists precisely those
privileges or immunities that would have been considered “fundamental.” See infra Part III.
49. See Fairman, supra note 18, at 139 (“Since [the Slaughter-House Cases] [the
Privileges Clause] has merely lingered on, performing virtually no duty as an operative part of
the Constitution.”).
50. Id. For a discussion of Fairman’s relationship with Frankfurter, see Richard L.
Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 CHI.-KENT. L.
REV. 1197, 1215–29 (1995) (outlining the decades long collaboration between the two men,
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The other important element missing from the traditional
analysis of the Privileges Clause is that the ideal the Amendment
sought to create was equal citizenship rights between citizens in the
states.51 This missing piece helps explain some of the shortcomings in
the traditional view, and suggests that a better approach to the
historiography would provide a better understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment.52
B. The Revisionist Story
Perhaps chafing against the limitations imposed on the
Fourteenth Amendment by the traditional story, some scholars have
reached a different conclusion on its meaning. Notably, these
revisionists believe that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated (at
least) the Bill of Rights against the states, and that the Privileges and
Immunities and Due Process Clauses were the vehicles by which this
was accomplished.53
Randy Barnett is a prominent member of the revisionist school.
In a characteristically trenchant piece, he suggests that our
“Misconceived Assumption about Constitutional Assumptions”54 has
led us to presume that parts of the Constitution mean things that
they need not and do not.55 From the outset he makes clear that the
traditional account is too stingy when it comes to the rights

including their contemporaneous work on the Fourteenth Amendment around the time the
Court decided Adamson).
51. See infra Part III.
52. Another criticism we can level at Fairman and Berger is that they display little
humility towards their sources and the contemporary actors who created them. That is, both
scholars seemingly fail to accept that disparagement or flippancy towards historical figures does
not strengthen an argument. While Bingham and others may not have had a modern scholar’s
understanding of the Bill of Rights or the nature of the Constitution, this is no reason to
ignore what they understood the provisions of their Amendment to be. First, they lacked the
same access to historical materials that we have today. Second, the exercise of examining a
historical record is not the same as grading a law-school exam. In other words, it is irrelevant if
the entire nation misunderstood the Privileges and Immunities Clause when it ratified the
Privileges Clause. All that matters is what they thought they were doing.
53. See generally CURTIS, supra note 3.
54. Randy Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 615 (2009).
55. In fact, Barnett’s piece continues his criticism of the contractarian approach to the
Constitution. See id. at 616–22 (“In this Article, I challenge this misconceived assumption
about the constitutional status of basic assumptions, which derives from a mistaken conflation
of constitutions and contracts.”).
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protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.56 For Barnett, “‘privileges
or immunities of citizens’ was a reference to natural rights in
addition to other particular positive rights contained in the Bill of
Rights.”57 Barnett has devoted a significant portion of his work to
discovering what rights are truly retained by the people, and his
libertarian lens focuses his views of the Fourteenth Amendment.58
Rather than delve into the Barnett canon, it is worthwhile to
consider his resolution of Fairman’s rights/police power false
dichotomy.59 Barnett notes that Thomas Cooley’s work A Treatise
on the Constitutional Limits Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of
the States of the American Union60 construed the state police power
contemporaneously with the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment.61 For Cooley, the police power was a tool for the
“preserv[ation of] the public order and . . . establish[ment] for the
intercourse of citizens with citizens . . . rules of good manners and
good neighborhood.”62 Barnett interprets this to mean that the
police power exists for reasonable regulation, but suggests that
modern readers should not assume that it was as broad as they do.63
In any case, he does not doubt the authority of the states to regulate
pursuant to their police power—he merely (but rightly) notes that

56. Id. at 635 (introducing his discussion of the Privileges Clause by noting that “the
original meaning of some allegedly vague terms may convey considerably more information
than is commonly thought”).
57. Id. at 635–36 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
58. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Three Federalisms, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 285, 289–91
(2008) (outlining his approach to privileges or immunities through a natural rights and
libertarian approach); Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 429, 456–75 (2004) (outlining his approach once again).
59. See supra notes 32–52 and accompanying text.
60. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868).
61. Barnett, supra note 54, at 654–55.
62. COOLEY, supra note 60, at 829.
63. Barnett, supra note 54, at 654–58. He is particularly concerned about morality
legislation. See id. at 656 (“The historical claim that the police power of states was assumed
also to include a power to regulated morality is both far more problematic and much more
complex.”). Again, Professor Barnett’s libertarianism is apparent, but his argument is
somewhat less compelling on this point. While Barnett is correct to note that Cooley devotes
little time to the subject, his claim that morality legislation was not an essential part of the
police power is somewhat surprising given the extensive scope of sexual and social legislation
that existed even at the Founding. There can be little doubt that longstanding laws against
prostitution, bigamy, sodomy, and pornography were, at least in part, morality measures.
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the Fourteenth Amendment limited these powers. The most
important point he makes along these lines is thus:
That the scope of the police power includes the protection of
individual rights seems consistent with, if not implicated by, the
text of the Constitution. First and foremost, it is consistent with
the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment’s implication that
there are natural individual liberty rights that shall not be denied or
disparaged.64

In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause is a means by which the federal government will
ensure state protection of natural rights, like those found in the
Ninth Amendment. It is hard to imagine an interpretation more
different than Fairman’s.
Before addressing this interpretation, it is worthwhile to put
Barnett’s view into relief with another revisionist piece. Michael Kent
Curtis’s No State Shall Abridge is less ambitious in its claim—namely,
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights
against the states.65 Curtis’s use of primary sources is more nuanced
and balanced than that of Fairman or Berger.66 Rather than making a
bolder assertion, Curtis simply lays out the congressional evidence
from 1865 to 1868 and then analyzes the response of the courts and
the public at large.67 It is therefore difficult to establish the precise
contours of his argument. Nevertheless, Curtis’s presentation of the
debates over the Amendment point toward an original
understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill
of Rights.68
The problem with this revisionist approach—though it is much
closer to being correct than Fairman’s—is that it merely is a
continuation of the same debate in Adamson. If Fairman parrots the
selective incorporation approach of his old teacher and colleague,
Felix Frankfurter,69 Barnett and Curtis are latter-day Blacks and

64. Id.
65. CURTIS, supra note 3, at 212–20 (suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the Bill of Rights).
66. Indeed, though Fairman was published almost forty years earlier, legal scholars have
cited Curtis’s work roughly the same number of times as Fairman’s Stanford Law Review piece.
67. See generally CURTIS, supra note 3.
68. The public understanding of the Amendment was a dynamic thing, as will be
demonstrated below. See infra Part III.
69. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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Douglases.70 Barnett suggests that all manner of natural rights are
incorporated against the states through the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment.71 He makes this claim somewhat
uncritically—though he may address it in more depth elsewhere72—
and somewhat inaccurately. Postwar Republicans were nationalizers,
certainly, but they were not unconscious of states as having some
authority—the structure of the Fourteenth Amendment presupposes
that states would be doing most of the regulating, with the federal
government as a check when the states got out of hand.73 As Curtis
pointed out, Republicans viewed federalism as analogous to the solar
system: “States must be kept within their proper orbit, an orbit that
would keep them from colliding with the rights of the individual.”74
This ought not surprise us. Midcentury Republican leaders—
almost to a man—were lawyers, men who were rather concerned
with the constitutional consequences of their actions.75 By framing
the argument in Adamson’s terms, revisionists fail to take account of
what was actually going on between 1866 and 1868. While it is true
that Radical Republicans and their more moderate allies were
concerned with establishing federal supremacy, they were not
interested in undoing the entire edifice of federalism. In this way,
arguments that depend on radical reorganization of the state (or
some proto-progressive statism) miss the mark.

70. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68–92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the first eight Amendments in their
entirety), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Justice Douglas joined Justice
Black’s dissent. Id. at 92.
71. Barnett, supra note 54, at 635–36.
72. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 253–69 (2004).
73. See CURTIS, supra note 3, at 41 (“Although Republicans rejected the notion that
states could invade the fundamental rights of citizens, they still wanted to preserve the
states.”).
74. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1088 (1866)
(statement of Rep. Woodbridge)).
75. Compare CURTIS, supra note 3, at 61–62 (detailing John Bingham’s legal concerns
over Congress’s rights-enforcement powers and his belief in the need for a Constitutional
amendment to that end), with Edward Whelan, Editorial, Look Who’s Politicizing Justice Now,
WASH. POST., Apr. 5, 2009, at B5 (quoting Nonvoting Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton who
spoke on electing a voting Representative for the District of Columbia: “I don't think
[Congresspersons] are in the least bit affected in their votes on the question of its
constitutionality . . . . People vote their politics in the House and in the Senate” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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The most important misstep in the revisionist story is the
characterization of the debate as one surrounding natural rights. The
Privileges Clause does not embody those rights—by the midnineteenth century, few people were talking about natural rights, and
even fewer mentioned them during the ratification arguments about
the Fourteenth Amendment.76 Moreover, the revisionist view of the
Privileges Clause does not contextualize the debate over the
Fourteenth Amendment as being uniquely shaped by the political
realities (and political theories) of the post-Civil War era.
An explanation for all of this is a combination of two serious
historiographical errors—anachronism and presentism.77 Believing
mid-century Republicans to have espoused the natural rights view is
anachronistic because they simply did not think of rights in that way.
Where early (Democratic-)Republicans like Madison and Jefferson
were concerned with man’s relationship to “Nature and Nature’s
God,”78 latter day Republicans were notably less religious in their
language than the Deist third President. Instead, their language is
almost exclusively about the relationship of citizen to state and other
citizen.79 This revisionist focus is also presentist as it ascribes to the
Republicans an interest in natural rights simply because we are
interested in them today. To conflate natural rights with
fundamental citizenship rights may be something we do in the
twenty-first century, but it was not done in the nineteenth.80

76. See discussion infra Parts III.A.2 and III.A.3.
77. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE PURPOSE OF THE PAST (2008) (explaining
the types of errors made in history-writing and the dangers of placing concepts out of their
historical place—anachronism—or imputing modern theories or beliefs onto historical actors—
presentism).
78. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
79. See generally infra Part III (explaining that the Republicans sought to enforce
equality of citizenship rights). There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule. Thaddeus
Stevens, in a speech entitled “Universal Suffrage,” explained that the “grand idea of [the
Founders] was that there were certain rights, privileges and immunities which belonged to
every being who had an immortal soul, none of which should be taken from him, nor could he
surrender them in any arrangement with society.” See Thaddeus Stevens, Universal Suffrage,
CIN. DAILY GAZETTE, Nov. 1, 1867, at 3, available at America’s Database of Historical
Newspapers http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and
password required).
80. See Stevens, supra note 79, at 3.
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C. The Contemporary Context

Bearing all of this background in mind, it is best to let the
framers of the Amendment speak for themselves. Bingham, in his
remarks in the House, explained “[t]here was a want hitherto, and
there remains a want now, in the Constitution of our country, which
the proposed amendment will supply. . . . [T]o protect by national
law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic .
. . .”81 This historical lacuna began at the first drafting of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which Bingham wrote to protect
“privileges and immunities and equal protection in the rights of life,
liberty, and property.”82 In essence, the draft empowered Congress
to create remedies for violations of Article IV, § 2 and incorporated
the Fifth Amendment. Bingham—the respected attorney and
abolitionist—viewed his Amendment as organic law that would undo
the “flagrant[] violat[ions of] the absolute guarantees of the
Constitution of the United States to all its citizens,” which for
Bingham meant the protections of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.83
Bingham believed that some rights appertained to American
citizenship, regardless of one’s state of residence. Consider his views
on the controversy surrounding the statehood admission process for
Oregon in 1859.84 Oregon’s proposed state constitution barred
African-Americans from entry and refused access to the court for
blacks already in the state.85 Bingham’s opposition to Oregon’s
admission to the Union turned on the failure of the proposed
Oregonian constitution to protect the rights held by the national

81. CURTIS, supra note 3, at 87 (internal citation omitted).
82. Id. at 84.
83. Id. at 59 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 35TH CONG., 2D SESS. 984 (1859)).
84. Id. at 59–60.
85. As John Bingham explained in his speech opposing Oregon’s entry into the Union,
the proposed state constitution contained a provision “which declares that [a] large number[]
of the citizens of the United States [that is, free blacks] shall not, after the admission of . . .
Oregon, come or be within said State; that they shall hold no property there; and that they
shall not prosecute any suits in any of the courts of the State; and that the Legislature shall, by
statute, make it a penal offense for any person to harbor any of the excluded class of their
fellow-citizens who may thereafter come or be within the State.” CONG. GLOBE, 35TH CONG.,
2D SESS. 984 (1859). Bingham concluded thus: “I deny that any State may exclude a law
abiding citizen of the United States from coming within its Territory, or abiding therein, . . .
or from the enjoyment therein of the ‘privileges and immunities’ of a citizen of the United
States.” Id.
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citizenry, which included those expressed in the Bill of Rights.86
Bingham and many others of his time did not accept the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Barron v. Baltimore,87 which rather conclusively
declared that the Bill of Rights did not apply against the states.88
Barron notwithstanding, Bingham and his cohort believed in federal
Constitutional supremacy89—a mistaken reading of the Supremacy
Clause, perhaps, but nevertheless a historically significant one.
In a similar vein, many Republicans believed that the Comity
Clause already protected privileges and immunities of national
citizenship. Congressman William D. Kelley of Pennsylvania thought
that the Constitution had powers “by which the General
Government may defend the rights, liberties, privileges, and
immunities of the humblest citizen, wherever he may be upon our
country’s soil.”90 The sources reveal similar thoughts from
Congressmen William Higby and Frederick Woodbridge.91 Even
archconservatives like Robert Hale (R-N.Y.) were not concerned
with the notion that “the states should be required to obey the Bill
of Rights . . . . He believed they already were required to do so.”92
In this context, Republican views on the Privileges Clause begin
to come into some relief. They understood the Amendment as
granting Congress authority to legislate “that hereafter no state shall
make it a crime for a man, whether he be black or white, a citizen of
the Republic, to learn the alphabet of his native tongue and his
rights and duties.”93
Views on the Constitution’s history were mixed, and for every
retrained view of the document there were those who considered it a
compact with the devil, or a Divine covenant lapsed by the Framer’s

86. Id. Bingham’s argument also applied the standard interpretation of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause in Article IV, which requires states to permit travel.
87. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1089–93 (1866).
88. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250–51; see also McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3079 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Like the Framers, many
19th-century Americans understood the Bill of Rights to declare inalienable rights that preexisted all government. Thus, even though the Bill of Rights technically applied only to the
Federal Government, many believed that it declared rights that no legitimate government
could abridge.” (citation omitted)).
89. See CURTIS, supra note 3, at 61.
90. Id. at 68 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 35TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1062–63 (1866)).
91. Id. at 68–69.
92. Id. at 69.
93. Id. at 62 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 432 (1866)).
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complicity in slavery.94 What they all agree upon, quite clearly, is that
the Amendment aimed at protecting and promoting equal
citizenship throughout the states. In the next Part, I propose to
show that this view is the likeliest given public understanding and
comment.
III. ORIGINAL PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING
Before beginning the exposition of the public understanding of
the Fourteenth Amendment, I think it is important to set forth some
historical parameters and attempt to justify them. Legal history fills
law reviews and court opinions more today than ever before.95 In
itself, this is not troubling and indeed may be a good thing,
particularly for originalists. Unfortunately, much of this history is so
poorly done that it would earn a first-year history graduate student a
stern lecture from her advisors.96 Poor or selective source selection is
rampant, as are hindsight bias and shoddy research.97 Originalism,
because it is so reliant on history, is thus more susceptible to
sophistry’s gentle drift away from fact.98
A good originalist, then, is exceptionally demanding when it
comes to the history she uses. But it can be difficult to figure out the
appropriate scope of an originalist inquiry—Whose opinion counts?
Who has to be excluded? Answers to these questions can, and do, fill
volumes. The following is illustrative: Bingham, Hale, Kelley, and all
the Republicans seemed to think that the Privileges Clause conveyed
at least political and civil rights, and perhaps human and social rights
to all Americans.99 In other words, the Clause vested Americans with
the rights of a national citizenry, the rights traditionally held by
Anglo-American citizens through history. Redeemers, Southerners,

94. See, e.g., Gordon A. Christenson, A Tale of Two Lawyers in Antebellum Cincinnati:
Timothy Walker’s Last Conversation with Salmon P. Chase, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 457, 472
(2003) (noting that William Lloyd Garrison “dismissed the United States Constitution as a
pact with the devil”).
95. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (relying heavily on
primary source document history to support the opinion of the Court and the opinions of the
other Justices); Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (same); Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (same).
96. See Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 526 (1995).
97. See id.
98. See id. at 524.
99. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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and the unreconstructed publically espoused a far more restrictive
view—states’ rights blocked the federal government from vesting the
franchise in freed slaves, or from enforcing various political rights
that had not inured in disfavored classes before the war.100 The
difficult choice for judges and scholars is deciding whose ideas
should prevail.
It is simple to argue that the aperture of the originalist lens
should be opened to capture the whole society, giving every
viewpoint an equal measure of credence. Democratic and simple as
that approach may be, it makes it all but impossible to reach a
conclusion—if everyone’s viewpoint is valid, how can a jurist or
scholar ever decide which should prevail? That would be an absurd
result, though. Surely former rebels didn’t believe that freed blacks
were possessed of the same rights as white citizens, but that should
be less relevant to this inquiry. Not only did former rebels lack
sufficient political power to represent the widest or strongest view of
what the Fourteenth Amendment or the Privileges Clause meant,
they had recently lost a Civil War related to similar questions. The
proper question is about what the most likely public understanding
of the Amendment was, and that question is unanswerable without
making pragmatic and (at times) normative judgments about whose
opinion should carry more weight. The most important element of
this analysis is honesty: a straightforward explanation of one’s
historiographical choices and, to the extent possible, an attempt to
avoid bias.
As in all history, it comes to making a choice. The first choice is
about the scope of study, because no inquiry can ever encompass an
entire era, let alone the entire history of a part of the Constitution.
For my purposes, I suggest that the years 1866–1873 are the best
indicators of original public understanding. The range is not so
narrow as to make sources difficult to locate or too remote in time to
bear upon the inquiry. Likewise, the timeframe is not so broad as to
encompass, later, more anachronistic views colored by time and
experience. On another level, the years from the Civil Rights Act
through the Slaughter-House Cases are compelling because they
frame the opening and closing of the conversation about privileges
or immunities.

100. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
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Privileges or Immunities
A. The Three Views

Having thus fully disclosed my historical approach, I lay out a
part of the historical arguments made at the time of the Amendment.
One point beyond question is that the phrase “privileges and/or
immunities” was on many lips during this time period.101 It is the
meaning behind these words that complicates the search for public
meaning. As mentioned above, the public comments on the
Privileges Clause fall into three categories, easily described by those
who most commonly made them. The first, or “narrow view” of the
Clause
came—unsurprisingly—from
Southerners,
former
102
Confederates, and the Supreme Court. Under this interpretation,
the antebellum understanding of the Comity Clause still obtained,
and privileges or immunities were quite restricted.103 The second or
“consensus view,” held by “moderates,” was that the Amendment
ensured a range of political and citizenship rights—including those
set forth in the Bill of Rights.104 Finally, the third or “Radical view”
was espoused, at least, by ardent abolitionists and Radical
Republicans who believed that the Clause conveyed the entire range
of civil and human rights, including protections against segregation
or discriminatory state practices.105 Whether one applies a statistical
101. See, e.g., Civil Government in North Carolina, MACON WKLY. TELEGRAPH, Dec. 24,
1866 (page 1) (noting that the readmission convention proposes to undertake the readmission
of “the district formerly comprising the State of North Carolina” into the Union and quoting
the proposed bill, whose goal is the “re-establishment of the said States and the reivesting [sic]
its loyal citizens with all the rights, privileges and immunities appertaining to the citizens of the
other States of the Union.”); Georgia Legislature, DAILY COLUMBUS ENQUIRER (Ga.), July
31, 1868 (page 3) (“The following bills were introduced and severally read the first time, to
wit: By Mr. Bradley—A bill to protect citizens in their privileges and immunities.”); Mr.
Etheridge Accepts the Nomination, MEM. DAILY AVALANCHE, Apr. 23, 1867 (page 2) (quoting
Conservative party gubernatorial nominee Emerson Etheridge as inviting all persons
“deserving the name and privilege of citizens” to help renew the state); Radical Ferocity,
WKLY. ARK. GAZETTE (El Paso), Apr. 28, 1868 (page 1) (“The oath referred to the proposed
act, requires every elector to swear to support the rights, privileges and immunities of all men,
without regard to race [or] color.”); Reconstruction, ALB. J., Jan. 7, 1867 (page 1) (Speech of
Rep. James Gibson) (mentioning privileges and immunities); The Conservative Convention,
DAILY COLUMBUS ENQUIRER (Ga.), Apr. 21, 1867 (page 1) (noting the convention’s concern
with “rights, privileges and immunities” of citizens and the notion of restoring the same to the
“disenfranchised” of the state). All of the sources in this footnote are available at America’s
Database
of
Historical
Newspapers
http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/
index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
102. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
103. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
104. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
105. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
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probability method or a common sense reading of the sources, a
picture begins to emerge that identifies the moderate approach as the
common public understanding.106
1. The narrow view
A century and a half has blunted our ability to believe that
anyone could have opposed the Union and Abraham Lincoln, but to
think this was always the case is a serious error.107 The war was an
unhealed wound in 1866, and Andrew Johnson was not equipped to
ensure that there was “malice towards none” in the course of the
Reconstruction.108 As Southern states imposed limits on freedmen
rights—the infamous Black Codes109—Republicans in Congress
moved to assert control over the situation. The Thirteenth
Amendment was already organic law, and the Fourteenth
Amendment became a necessary condition for readmission to the
Union and, consequently, the seating of Southern representatives on
Capitol Hill.110 Unsurprisingly, the Amendment became a topic of
enormous importance and near-constant debate in the media and in
state legislatures around the Union.
Southerners knew there was no avoiding ratification, just as there
was no avoiding reentry into a Union whose armed troops
maintained the new order. The loss of the war made compliance with
106. Readers should be aware that newspapers had palpable biases in this era. A look at
their names gives the gist: one can hardly expect the Daily Austin Republican to provide “fair
and balanced” coverage of the affairs of the day. Yet the manner in which the biases make
themselves evident is important. Rather than skewing coverage, the papers tended to
reproduce exactly what opponents said or did (good journalism) and then editorialized
throughout by peppering their coverage with incredulous statements (bad journalism). In
other cases, the papers would just criticize the speaker in the closing paragraphs of the article
itself, rather than write a separate opinion column. The papers are thus simultaneously more
blatant in their bias and more reliable in their coverage. As a result, they are useful as a source
of public understanding. See also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3072–73 &
n.12 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining the noted biases of newspapers in the midnineteenth century, including the New York Times).
107. John Harlan, the lone dissenter in Plessy v. Ferguson, was a longtime defender of
slavery and opposed Lincoln’s re-election campaign in 1864, even while he led a regiment of
Unionist Kentucky volunteers. See generally LOREN P. BETH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: THE
LAST WHIG JUSTICE (1992) (detailing Harlan’s development from pro-slavery Democrat to
champion of an anti-discriminatory reading of the Constitution).
108. For a fine account of Johnson’s woes while in office, and his inability to control
Reconstruction, see HANS L. TREFOUSSE, ANDREW JOHNSON: A BIOGRAPHY (1997).
109. Id. at 230.
110. See NORMAN K. RISJORD, THE CIVIL WAR GENERATION 226 (2002).
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Republican demands a matter of grumbling, but not of debate. But
if ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was indisputable for
Southerners,111 the interpretation of its first Section was not.
Ironically, the broadest reading of the Privileges Clause came from
Southern and Democratic opponents. Like Jeffersonians of old
railing against the Necessary and Proper Clause,112 these speakers
claimed that a privilege was “everything it is desirable to have,”113
and that it would force states to grant suffrage to freed slaves.114
Some called the Amendment “more Radical than anything that has
heretofore come from” the Congress.115 At the beginning of the
ratification debates, then, its opponents cast the Fourteenth
Amendment as conveying an enormous range of rights.
Upon ratification that tune changed quickly. Once effective, the
formerly mammoth Privileges Clause shrunk to boundaries
coterminous with the traditional reading of the Privileges Clause.116
Thus, rather than conveying “everything that is desirable,” the
Clause merely ensured the right to hold property and move freely
and no other political rights.117 Under this approach, the antebellum

111. Other states could, and did, dispute it. Some, like New Jersey, went so far as to
rescind ratification, while others simply refused to ratify in the first place. See generally Douglas
H. Bryant, Unorthodox and Paradox: Revisiting the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
53 ALA. L. REV. 555 (2002) (noting that New Jersey, Ohio, and Oregon rescinded their
ratification of the Amendment, while Kentucky, Delaware, Maryland, and California never
ratified the Amendment at all). The Radical Republicans—in control of Reconstruction,
Congress, and the army—did not find these arguments persuasive, and the Amendment
became a fait accompli.
112. Resolutions Adopted by the Kentucky General Assembly (Nov. 10, 1798), in 30
JEFFERSON PAPERS 552–53 (Barbara Oberg ed., 2004).
113. See CURTIS, supra note 3, at 149 (quoting PA. LEG. REC. APP. XIII (1867)).
114. See Speech of Hon. Charlton Burnett, HARRISBURG WKLY. PATRIOT AND UNION,
Jan. 31, 1867 (page 1), available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://
www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
Indeed, fear of enfranchising blacks is a recurring theme throughout the ratification debates
and later.
115. The Radical Reconstruction Plan, DAILY COLUMBUS ENQUIRER (Ga.), Apr. 28,
1866 (page 1), available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://
www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
116. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
117. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 3, at 81; The Radical Programme, Strong Letter of Gov.
Perry of South Carolina Against the Constitutional Amendment, DAILY PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Nov. 11, 1866 (page 2) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment could not require
states to grant political rights to freedmen, as doing so was a purely local matter), available at
America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/
index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
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understanding of federalism would remain intact, permitting each
state to set qualifications for office and the scope of political and civil
rights. “Privileges or immunities” were simply those rights of
movement, work, and access to the government.118 There was no
irreducible quantum of fundamental rights that reposed in the
people beyond these, and the federal government could not force
the states to comply with a congressionally mandated set of privileges
or immunities.119
Given the historical circumstances, this approach is difficult to
accept at face value. These views are almost identical to prewar
notions of privileges and immunities and federal-state relations,
restrictive notions embodied even in the Confederate
Constitution.120 As the Daily Austin Republican—a Unionist Texan
newspaper—put it in 1868:
[For Southerners] [t]o assert that the XIV article is susceptible of a
construction which would confer the unrestricted regulation of
suffrage upon the States, is to charge the Republican party with
having deliberately incorporated into the constitution of the
country the secession theory of State Rights, and of having
surrendered every principle of nationality involved in the terrible
civil war . . . .121

It is clear that Southerners did not see the matter this way when
they made their arguments; it is also clear that some of these
arguments were disingenuous. When the subject matter was black
suffrage or eligibility for office, Southern whites were rather stingy
with the privileges or immunities guaranteed under the Constitution.
Yet when whites had their own prerogatives threatened, Section 1
transformed into a wellspring of political and civil rights. Consider

118. See, e.g., Reconstruction, ALB. J., Jan. 7, 1867, at 1 (speech of Rep. James Gibson)
(setting out what could be included in “privileges and immunities”), available at America’s
Database
of
Historical
Newspapers
http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index
.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
119. Contra infra note 157 and accompanying text.
120. CONFED. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and shall have the right of transit and
sojourn in any State of this Confederacy, with their slaves and other property; and the right of
property in said slaves shall not be thereby impaired.”).
121. The XIV Amendment, DAILY AUSTIN REPUBLICAN, Dec. 16, 1868 (page 1),
available
at
America’s
Database
of
Historical
Newspapers
http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password
required).
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the case of one T. T. Fauntleroy, Jr., who in a letter to the head of
his military district complains that his receipt of a pardon made him
“a new man; fully rehabilitated with all the functions, rights,
privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States . . .
accordingly [] allowed to vote.”122 Compare these sentiments with
the article “Is a Negro Eligible to Office in Georgia,” from the April
2, 1869 Macon Weekly Telegraph. Judge Schley (of the Chatham
Superior Court) says that blacks are certainly not entitled to run for
office and cites Dred Scott and Corfield v. Coryell as his authority.123
To put it another way, proponents of the narrow view were
advocating a theory of constitutional interpretation that not only
relied on antebellum federalism, it relied on the very case that the
Fourteenth Amendment set out to overrule.124
The Georgia Weekly Telegraph illustrates the scope of the enmity
Southerners had towards the consensus and Radical view readings of
the Amendment on November 12, 1869, reproducing an editorial in
the Montgomery Advertiser, by explaining how it is all but impossible
to keep freed blacks from voting. The segment concludes: “This is
our opinion after full examination and reflection on the subject. It
will be in the power of the States, (perhaps,) to exclude negroes from
holding office, but not from voting.”125 Quite obviously, the
Southern states were looking to interpret away the rights inherent in
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Narrow view adherents were not beyond sophistry and evasion.
Consider the case of G.T. Ruby, a free black from Maine living in
Texas under General Sheridan’s control, as explained in Flake’s Daily
Bulletin, of Galveston, Texas.126 Ruby sued for recognition of the

122. See Executive Pardon and Political Disabilities, DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
June 17, 1869 (page 8) (emphasis added), available at America’s Database of Historical
Newspapers http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and
password required). The fact that his demand for the franchise was denied was a matter of
interpretation of the extent of Johnson’s pardon, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment.
123. Is a Negro Eligible to Office in Georgia, MACON WKLY. TELEGRAPH, Apr. 2, 1869
(page 8), available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://
www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
124. Sanez v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 n.15 (1999) (noting that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to overrule the Dred Scott decision).
125. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, GEORGIA WKLY. TELEGRAPH, Nov. 12,
1869 (page 6), available at http://telegraph.galileo.usg.edu/telegraph/view?docId=news/
mwt1869/mwt1869-0337.xml.
126. The Ruby Suit, FLAKE’S DAILY BULLETIN (Galveston, Tex.), May 5, 1868, at 4,
available
at
America’s
Database
of
Historical
Newspapers
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rights of blacks on steamboats. He also organized one of the first
black labor unions, making Galveston’s port open to large numbers
of black stevedores and other workers. The article, which (to put it
delicately) is contentious, suggests that the Comity Clause cannot
mean that each state’s internal regulations can have control in other
jurisdictions: “The section does not embrace any privilege conferred
by the local laws of a State.”127 By framing the argument as one
related to Article IV, and not the Fourteenth Amendment, Flake
reveals the flimsiness of its arguments. The author lists the usual
Article IV rights—travel, disposing property, petitioning the
government, etc.128—and acts as though this disposes of the matter.
Like Fairman’s argument, the article proposes a straw man Comity
Clause and dismisses non-textual rights or federal enforcement. 129
Some who held the narrow view were more straightforward in
their reasoning,130 others were unabashedly hypocritical.131 In any
event, that unreconstructed rebels, former Copperheads, and States’
Rightists would hold these views should be some indication of how
little merit they deserve. The problem is not that Southerners did
http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password
required).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. For good measure, the author of the article then suggests that any reading of the
Constitution other than his would allow “Mr. Brigham Young [to] move his harem and forty
wives to Galveston Island.” Id.
130. Some simply feared the vastly expanded power of Congress. Unseated Mississippi
Senator William Sharkey was concerned that “we may find Congress conferring ‘privileges and
immunities’ on one class to the exclusion of another class.” Letter from Hon. W.L. Sharkey, of
Mississippi, DAILY MEM. AVALANCHE, October 2, 1866 (page 2) (“[The Fourteenth
Amendment] proceeds to prohibit the States from making or enforcing any law ‘which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens.’ It does not say what are privileges and
immunities; that is left for the next Congress to provide in virtue of the last section, which
declares that Congress shall ‘have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.’”), available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers
http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password
required).
131. See, e.g., Meeting of the Citizens of Fulton and DeKalb Counties, GEORGIA WKLY.
(Macon, Ga.), June 14, 1867 (page 5) (noting that the Sherman Act would require Georgians
to mark the graves of her war dead with “Traitor” or “Rebel,” and that Georgia demanded
that the Act not apply. Georgia’s resolves included the following: “Resolved, That Georgia
only asks, as it is her right to expect, and her duty to demand under the guarantees of the
Constitution of which she was a co-architect and builder, the same privileges and immunities as
those enjoyed by any other State composing the American Union. She asks nothing more, will
never accept any less.”), available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://
www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
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not have a valid claim: the problem is that their claim was only valid
until 1865 and their loss of the War. Modern readers may disagree
with the narrow view and limit its value in an originalist inquiry, but
they ignore it with some peril. Nevertheless, the political realities of
the late 1860s ought to give pause to anyone who thinks this view
should prevail.132
a. The strange case of the Slaughter House. Despite the weight of
the evidence and the patent unreasonableness of the narrow view,
the Supreme Court adopted it just four years after passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The (much and rightly) maligned
Slaughter-House Cases133 represent an abdication of judicial duty on
par with Dred Scott v. Sanford. Put briefly, the Court held that the
right to conduct personal business without interference by state
monopolies was not a privilege or immunity of citizenship.134 Yet,
rather than end the decision there—which would be a limited, but
wholly defensible reading of the Fourteenth Amendment—Justice
Miller proceeds to dismantle the Privileges Clause by adopting the
narrow view. Like Chief Justice Taney before him in Dred Scott,
Miller undertakes an unnecessary but highly consequential
examination of the Privileges Clause and effectively reads it out of
the Constitution.135
The opinion defines privileges or immunities as though they
inhered in the undifferentiated mass of the people, rather than in
individuals. Thus, the controversy is whether Crescent City’s
monopoly came “at the expense of the great body of the community
of New Orleans.”136 working a “gross injustice to the public, and
invasion of private right.”137 Only the last clause of the last sentence
should bear on an inquiry of breach of the Privileges Clause: Has the
state invaded a private right? Instead, Miller depicts the controversy
as one between the general rights of the people to be protected and

132. Try to imagine a debate about the 26th Amendment where the Democratcontrolled Congress and President Johnson argue one interpretation and Barry Goldwater and
the John Birch Society argue the other. Now imagine that Goldwater had lost the Civil War
and not just the election of 1964.
133. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
134. Id. at 72–83.
135. Id. at 77.
136. Id. at 60.
137. Id. at 61.
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the state’s exercise of its police power.138 While the Fourteenth
Amendment certainly preserved the police power,139 Miller renders
the Privileges Clause nugatory by establishing the supremacy of state
law over it—precisely the opposite result of what its framers and
ratifiers envisioned.140
The proper inquiry in this case was whether Louisiana, through
the City of New Orleans, had violated individual butchers’ privileges
or immunities. In this way, Miller’s citations to New York v. Miln141
and the License Tax Cases142 are inapposite. No one disputed that the
states are entitled to reasonable regulations of matters taking place
within their boundaries. Nevertheless, Miller “reduce[s matters] to
these terms: Can any exclusive privileges be granted to any of its
citizens, or to a corporation, by the legislature of a State?”143 This
was no “reduction”: framing the question so broadly permitted
Miller to take the opinion in the direction he wanted, rather than
one necessarily implicated by the case.
To that end, he ponders whether the State had violated the Civil
War Amendments.144 He proceeds to prove too much and too little.
Miller explains that all natural born persons are citizens of the
United States and thus subject to the protection of the national
government.145 The Amendment states “‘No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States.’”146 Miller apparently considers the fact
that the Clause mentions United States citizenship as so pregnant
with meaning as to dispose of the whole matter.
Of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United
States, and of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the
State, and what they respectively are, we will presently consider; but

138. Id. at 61–65.
139. See supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text.
140. See infra Part III.A.2.
141. 32 U.S. 102 (1837) (embracing the notion that the police power enables states to
legislate for the health, welfare, and morals of the people while avoiding the resolution of a
claim under the Commerce Clause).
142. 72 U.S. 462 (1866) (explaining that “the power and right of the States to tax,
control, or regulate any business carried on within its limits” is beyond question under the
Constitution).
143. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 65.
144. Id. at 66.
145. Id. at 72–74.
146. Id. at 74 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
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we wish to state here that it is only the former which are placed by
this clause under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and
that the latter, whatever they may be, are not intended to have any
additional protection by this paragraph of the amendment.147

All of this seems to ignore his immediately foregoing analysis of
the Citizenship Clause, which is a federal creation of state
citizenship. In dissent, Justice Field rightly recognizes this
incongruity when he ties the majority’s reasoning on citizenship to
John C. Calhoun “and the class represented by him” during the
Nullification Crisis of the 1830s.148
Adding insult to injury, Miller determines that the Comity and
Privileges Clauses are synonymous. Apparently, the drafting and
ratification history of the Amendment were mistaken: the two
Clauses are coterminous. To accept this view, one must also accept
that the Radical Republicans who had just waged a Civil War and
forced three constitutional Amendments upon the legislatures of the
vanquished South decided that enforcement of equal rights within a
state would be no priority at all.
And Miller must have so believed, for he wrote that the
Privileges Clause “threw around [Privileges or Immunities] in that
clause no security for the citizen of the State in which they were
claimed or exercised. Nor did it profess to control the power of the
State governments over the rights of its own citizens.”149 In other
words, the Amendment was a “vain and idle enactment, which
accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited Congress and
the people on its passage.”150
As the jurist who dispatched the Privileges Clause, Justice Miller
is the successor to the adherents of the narrow view, and the
progenitor of the traditional story later told by Fairman. A
jurisprudential Janus, he marries the prewar conceptualizations of
federalism and police power with postwar Southern views on the
147. Id.
148. Id. at 94 (Field, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 77 (majority opinion); see also Negro Suffrage to be “Snaked” upon the People
Through the Rump Amendment, and Enforced by the Supreme Court, HARRISBURG WKLY.
PATRIOT AND UNION, Sept. 13, 1866, at 4 (“ [Section 1] simply gave to every man equal civil
rights. It was false that it implied negro suffrage. It gave the right to sue and be sued, hold
property, etc.”), available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers
http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/ind ex.shtml#tab_news (username and password
required).
150. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
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limited scope of federal rights enforcement. It is difficult to imagine
a less textually faithful or more politically damaging reading of the
Amendment, yet it has prevailed with no serious challenge for more
than a century and a quarter.
2. The consensus view
The decision in the Slaughter-House Cases marked the end of the
public debate over privileges or immunities, but a robust discussion
had taken place over the preceding four years. Indeed, there is a rich
repository of public comment and debate in the newspapers, the
Congressional Record, and private correspondence that reveals the
depth of interest in the second clause of Section 1.
Though the Southern view on the Amendment prevailed, the
view of its drafters and ratifiers sheds important and contradictory
light on the meaning of its provisions. Public meaning, of course, is
about more than the “intent of the framers,” but that does not
render their input and influence irrelevant. The arguments made in
support of the Amendment and public comments give insight into
the mind of the authors of the Privileges Clause. Moreover, popular
response and the debate in the public forum put the original intent
into relief and begin to reveal the outline of what can be referred to
as the consensus view—namely that the Clause protected citizenship
rights among the citizenry of the state against discriminatory or
arbitrary abridgement.
John Bingham, of course, plays a central role in this analysis. The
Pennsylvania-born Ohio lawyer had a lifelong animosity towards
slavery that permeated his approach to the law.151 Curtis points out
that his abolitionism manifested itself in a deep affinity for the Bill of
Rights and the Privileges and Immunities Clause.152 As noted above,
Bingham believed that the Bill of Rights applied against the states—
Barron v. Baltimore notwithstanding—and the Privileges Clause
supplied a substantive body of rights to all citizens of the Union.153
And, as Curtis explains, many of Bingham’s fellow Republicans
believed that the Bill of Rights had always applied against the states,

151. See Richard L. Aynes, The Continuing Importance of Congressman John A. Bingham
and the Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 589, 591–98 (2003)
(describing Bingham’s upbringing and education in an integrated college in Ohio).
152. See CURTIS, supra note 3, at 59.
153. Id.
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and that all the federal government lacked was an enforcement
capacity.154 This view created a relationship between the Bill of
Rights and Article IV, Section 2,155 so it should not be surprising
that Republicans sought to protect anti-slavery and pro-Union
speakers throughout the South from laws or prosecution—they
wanted to ensure the freedom of speech and assembly.156
Some insight into the rights-oriented nature of the Privileges
Clause comes upon examination of Republican constitutional theory.
Republicans did not hide their belief that the substantive provisions
of the Constitution—the Bill of Rights and Privileges Clause in
particular—conveyed an irreducible quantum of liberty upon every
American citizen.157 Republicans feared the denial of speech and
assembly rights in the South both before and after the War,158 and
more generally espoused the belief that the Bill of Rights applied
against the states.159 It is highly unlikely that Republicans would have
drafted or promoted an Amendment so limited as described by the
narrow view, or that their supporters in the state legislatures would
have ratified it.160
Another important element of the Republican rhetoric was the
infusion of the language of equality. It becomes quite apparent
throughout their debates that the Republicans were concerned with
ensuring blacks and Unionists equal citizenship and protection under

154. See id. at 61–64 (outlining Republican views on the Bill of Rights).
155. Such is Curtis’s basic premise, viz. the Privileges Clause incorporated the Bill of
Rights in accord with Republican constitutional theory. See generally id. (adopting this position
throughout the course of his work).
156. Id. at 59 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 157–58 (1866)).
157. See id. at 49; CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (quoting John Bingham
espousing a broad, substantive interpretation of Article IV, § 2).
158. CURTIS, supra note 3, at 38–40 (describing Republican views on speech suppression
in the antebellum South); The New Element in Kentucky Politics, CIN. DAILY GAZETTE, Aug.
31, 1867 (page 1) (quoting prominent antebellum abolitionist and Union General James
Brisbin as saying, “I had read in the Constitution of the United States that there should be no
abridging of freedom of speech, or freedom of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble”), available at America’s Database of
Historical Newspapers
http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password
required).
159. See CURTIS, supra note 3, at 51–56 (citing speeches by Republicans and showing the
commonness of the theory of incorporation).
160. This Article does not address the claims that the Fourteenth Amendment was never
really ratified, and does so relying on Professor Amar’s refutations of that theory in AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 364–66.
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the law.161 Curtis chronicles the equality-reinforcing nature of the
Amendment in greater detail and depth than I intend to do here.162
Suffice it to say that the majority of Republicans thought they were
creating an equal citizenship provision in and through the Privileges
Clause.163 Once again, context is crucial. The “states formerly in
rebellion” were enacting draconian ordinances that restricted black
property holding, participation in government, and even rights of
locomotion.164 Given that the Republicans wrote the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 to undo the Black Codes, and then wrote the Fourteenth
Amendment to—at a minimum—constitutionalize the Civil Rights
Act, one can hardly accept a reading of the Amendment that does
not mandate intrastate citizenship equality.
They also thought, most reasonably, that they were not undoing
the power of states to establish rights, privileges, or immunities. As
their statements make clear, they presumed the states would have the
authority to set the basic contours of privileges or immunities for
their citizens—they were simply forbidden from denying some
citizens the same treatment as others.
The views taken in the late 1860s by members of Congress or
what we would now call “Washington insiders” has been studied,
argued, and reargued ad nauseum in the academy.165 The more
important inquiry for originalists is what the people outside
Washington said on the matter. At the very least, Southerners
recognized that the Amendment conveyed the rights of citizens to
freed blacks. The Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives in
late 1866 admitted as much in legislative deliberation of whether to
ratify the Fourteenth Amendment when he declared that Texas must
vote against ratification, if only because the Amendment conveyed
“the priceless rights of American citizenship” to the freed slaves.166
161. See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1065 (1866) (arguing that the
Amendment guaranteed equal rights under law for blacks and whites). This citation is the
source of Fairman’s eye-rolling: “of course, a state law could hardly violate every provision of
the Constitution.” See supra note 34.
162. See generally CURTIS, supra note 3.
163. Id. at 49–50.
164. See supra note 109.
165. See, e.g., supra Part II.A–II.B. (describing “insider” source histories by Fairman and
Berger); infra Part IV.A.1. (describing Justice Thomas’s use of elite sources in his concurrence
in McDonald v. City of Chicago).
166. Texas on the Constitutional Amendment, MACON DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 1, 1866
(page 2) (Speech of Hon. N.M. Burford), available at America’s Database of Historical
Newspapers http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and
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The Republicans themselves made quite clear what they thought
they had done. The Republican Congressional Committee declared
that “the negroes of the South, by the measures of the Republican
party as expressed [in the Reconstruction Acts] are elevated to the
full and equal rights of citizens of the States to which they belong,
and of the country, which hereafter will recognize no distinctions on
account of race or color.”167 Note that freedmen are full and equal
citizens “of the States to which they belong,” meaning that the preratification Reconstruction Acts sought the equalization of
citizenship within the states.168
Many Republicans thought that the Amendment conferred
political rights on freedmen, and relied on Corfield v. Coryell.169 In
fact, some leaders considered the deprivation of political rights in the
South a violation of the Guaranty Clause.170 The language describing
the South being an “oligarchy” or “slave-ocracy” is not a modern

password required). In fact, Burford tries to convince Texans to “refuse willingly to transfer
our [illegible] from the great master race of the races constituting the Caucasian family of
nations to ‘Africans and the descendants of Africans.’” Id. Nathan Bedford Forrest himself
would have had no argument with that line of reasoning.
167. Republican Congressional Committee, THE FARMER’S CABINET (Amherst, N.H.),
May 30, 1867 (page 2), available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://
www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
168. Curtis and others make clear that the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized
more than the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and there is no reason to assume that the language of
the Privileges Clause did not aim at the same equality provisions.
169. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 3, at 114 (outlining Lyman Trumbull’s reliance on, and
interpretation of Corfield to set out what were the fundamental rights of citizens).
170. See, e.g., The XIV Amendment, supra note 121, (page 1) (asserting that the federal
government had always been empowered to enforce political and fundamental rights against
the states), available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://www.library.nd.
edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required). This argument,
so like the typical Republican view of the Bill of Rights—namely, that Barron v. Baltimore was
irrelevant—bears examining in full. The author suggests that the speech-suppressing,
disenfranchising governments in the prewar and postwar South
could in no sense be called republican, the essence of which is the consent of the
governed, and in such a case it would have been the imperative duty of the
government of the United States, under article four, to step in and guarantee to
such State a republican government. Until the emancipation of the slaves, they were,
under the constitution, not citizens but merely persons, and therefore not entitled
to demand the exercise of these high prerogatives of the government in their behalf,
but their status was changed by the results of the war, and the benefits of the
fundamental inured to them as well as to other native citizens of the country.
Id. In other words, freedom of expression and voting rights were sine qua non of a republican
form of government, and thus inured to newly free black citizens.
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invention.171 For example, in “A Colored Man’s Speech,” the
speaker noted, “the poor white man, debased as much by slavery as
the colored man, cringed the supple knee to the dark image of the
slave oligarchy . . . . [He was] as subservient a tool to the rich white”
as slaves.172 This almost Marxist critique of the political
superstructure of the South found voice in Charles Sumner, the old
foe of slavery and Boston Brahmin.173 Railing against
disenfranchisement in the South, Sumner noted that
[a] Republic is a pyramid standing on the broad mass of the people
as a base; but here is a pyramid balanced on its point. To call such a
government “republican” is a mockery of sense and decency. . . . It
is not difficult to classify these States. They are aristocracies or
oligarchies.174

In one sense, this Guaranty Clause argument moves voting rights
beyond the realm of privileges or immunities and into the category
of fundamental rights of (male) citizens.175 There were certainly
others who considered the Guaranty Clause the font of freedmen
suffrage, adding a second dimension to the considerations of their
political rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.176 Others still

171. Though it is prominent in modern literature. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 16, at 371
(“A long history of slavocratic contempt for core republican freedoms formed yet another
factor inclining Sumner, Bingham, and company to a strongly nationalistic and democratic
understanding of Article IV.”).
172. A Colored Man’s Speech, CIN. DAILY GAZETTE, July 2, 1867 (page 1), available at
America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.
shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
173. Sumner’s status among abolitionists and freed blacks was legendary, as was his
popularity in Massachusetts. When Congressman Preston Brooks brutally beat Sumner with a
cane on the floor of the Senate for his anti-slavery comments, Massachusetts refused to replace
him and left his seat vacant. South Carolinians, on the other hand, responded by gratefully
sending Brooks dozens of canes to replace the one he had cracked in half on Sumner’s head.
See SHELBY FOOTE, THE CIVIL WAR: A NARRATIVE: FORT SUMTER TO PERRYVILLE 15
(1986).
174. AMAR, supra note 16, at 375 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 674–
87 (1866)).
175. Apparently, few people thought women were competent to vote, though feminists
forcefully tried to make the argument. See infra note 222 and accompanying text (outlining
Susan B. Anthony’s arguments in favor of female suffrage).
176. See, e.g., A Republican Form of Government, OREGONIAN (Portland), Jan. 8, 1866
(page 2) (reproducing comments of Judge Redfield of Vermont, who claimed that the
franchise was an ineluctable element of the freedman’s new rights), available at America’s
Database
of
Historical
Newspapers
http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/
index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
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invoked federal intervention in Kentucky to protect Unionists, lest
the State violate the Guaranty Clause. Among the anti-Republican
features of the Constitution was its “disfranch[isement of] some
forty or fifty thousand of its free male citizens of the constitutional
voting age.”177
Nevertheless, the primary debate at the time was how best to
interpret the political ramifications of the Privileges Clause.178 Public
debate on the matter was unsurprisingly vigorous, given the stakes.
For example, Congressman Charlton Burnett lays out the Corfield
argument for inclusion of the franchise in “privileges or immunities”
as early as 1866.179 Southern Unionists argued for immediate
restoration of “rights, privileges and immunities” of the
“disenfranchised” citizens of Georgia,180 while the Baltimore Sun
opined that “Privileges and Immunities do not include the right to
hold office, but rather the right to vote.”181
The non-Washington Republicans can speak for themselves. In
Pennsylvania, the Republicans believed that
[w]e can have no guarantees against future treason more valuable
than to render permanent by organic laws the principles triumphant
in the war. These . . . [are] the vote by ballot; equality of civil and
political rights, privileges and immunities; the nationality of
citizenship, the unitary integrity of the republic . . .182

177. Kentucky Reconstruction, CIN. DAILY GAZETTE, Aug. 13, 1867 (page 3), available
at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/
index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
178. Of course, the political-rights element of the Privileges Clause makes sense by
reading the Amendment as a whole. Section 1 embraces rights, including the franchise, Section
2 punishes states that deny citizens suffrage, and Section 5 permits Congress to enforce these
provisions. Moreover, Section 2 reinforces the notion that voting was included in the Privileges
Clause given that representation depended on the “whole number of persons in each State.”
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2. If blacks were not permitted to vote or hold office but were
counted for representation, the Amendment was a gift to Southern Democrats in addition to
being, of course, taxation without representation.
179. See Speech of Hon. Charlton Burnett, supra note 114.
180. The Conservative Convention, DAILY COLUMBUS ENQUIRER (Ga.), Apr. 21, 1867
(page 1), available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://www.library.nd.
edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
181. Opinion: Privileges and Immunities, THE SUN (Balt.), Sept. 12, 1868 (page 1),
available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://www.library.nd.edu/
find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
182. Platform of the Pennsylvania Republican Party, THE N. AM. (Phila.), June 28, 1867
(page 2), available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://www.library.nd.
edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
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In New Jersey, the Grand Old Party called on “Congress to take
measures to induce [all States to enact] a just and uniform rule of
suffrage, excluding all distinctions of class, race or color, so that the
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several States.”183 Back in Ohio, Senator James
Sherman declared that “[t]he logical consequences of the great
events through which we have passed is [sic] to broaden the elective
franchise.”184 In Texas, Republicans resolved that “no individual or
class of society shall ever hereafter be debarred from the rights,
privileges and immunities common to all citizens, and especially
those of suffrage and holding office . . . .”185 Their inconsistent views
apparent again, Southerners complained about the loyalty oath186
that purported to require fealty to the universal applicability of
“rights, privileges and immunities” of all citizens while
simultaneously disenfranchising former rebel leaders.187
In short, a widely held understanding of the Privileges Clause
was that it required states to grant the franchise to citizens in their
jurisdiction and perhaps African Americans as well.188 This is the view
that obtained in the public, even though John Bingham disagreed.189

183. Political: The Republicans in New Jersey, BOS. DAILY J., July 25, 1867 (page 4),
available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://www.library.nd.edu/
find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
184. Speech by Senator Sherman, CIN. DAILY GAZETTE, Aug. 21, 1867 (page 2), available
at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/
index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
185. Legislative Acts, DAILY AUSTIN REPUBLICAN, June 26, 1868 (pages 2–3), available
at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/
index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
186. WKLY. ARK. GAZETTE, Sept. 22, 1868 (page 2), available at America’s Database of
Historical
Newspapers
http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news
(username and password required).
187. Id.
188. The existence of the Fifteenth Amendment cuts either way regarding this
contention. Narrow view adherents might argue that, had political rights been a part of
privileges or immunities, then the Section 5 power was all that was necessary, not an
amendment. Consensus and Radical view supporters (and postwar Republicans) could counter
that the South had proven all too adept at avoiding federal legislation regarding voting. In any
event, and the Fifteenth Amendment notwithstanding, Southern states disenfranchised African
Americans for generations.
189. This is, perhaps, the best case against original intent originalism and in favor of
public meaning originalism. The fact that the public (and Radical) understanding of the
Amendment likely included voting or political rights despite the Framer’s intent is why it is a
“consensus view.” On Bingham’s disagreement, see CURTIS, supra note 3, at 87.
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The consensus view, therefore, encompassed a floor of
fundamental rights: those found in the Bill of Rights and the exercise
of some political power in the state, along with certain
antidiscrimination principles. What this amounts to is a succinct
definition of Republican views of citizenship rights. A citizen must
be able to speak, assemble, be secure in their person, and keep liberty
and property, and so the Bill of Rights is finally applied to the
states.190 A citizen must be on the same footing as other citizens,
subject to the nondiscriminatory and reasonable police power, and so
internal equality is reinforced by the Privileges or Immunities, Equal
Protection, and Due Process Clauses.191 A citizen cannot
meaningfully discharge his or her privileges or immunities or direct
the affairs of the state without political power, and protection of
voting rights is the surest way to guarantee a republican form of
government.192 This was the legacy Republicans sought to leave
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Four people who accepted this legacy and fought against its
frustration wrote the Slaughter-House Cases dissents. Justice Field in
particular provided the legal, as opposed to political, argument in
favor of the Republican consensus theory of the Privileges Clause.
He began by setting forth the proper scope of the state’s police
power, and his view dovetailed the Republican approach to state
regulatory authority. Namely, he reasoned that while states are
entitled to regulate for the “health, good order, morals, peace, and
safety of society,”193 the simple fact that a state exercises its authority
does not make it a valid police power.194 Field recognized that the
case was to be decided at the intersection of the state’s authority and
the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the Court’s duty was to
determine which was to prevail.195 The Amendment recognized the
“fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to him
190. Id. at 87–88.
191. Professor Barnett makes a strong case that these three Clauses are mutually
reinforcing and all related to equality. See Barnett, supra note 54, at 23–24.
192. It is also, of course, a good way to ensure a Republican form of government.
Protecting the franchise of freedmen and loyal southerners may have been part of Republican
constitutional theory, but national political viability for the GOP was certainly a pleasant
incidental benefit.
193. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 87 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 87–90 (detailing why the monopoly granted in this case was not an
appropriate exercise of Louisiana’s police power).
195. Id. at 94.
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as a free man and a free citizen . . . as a citizen of the United States,”
though these were subject to state regulation.196 Field then
delineated what he believed “privileges or immunities” to mean,197
and in so doing offered a précis of the consensus view:
What the [Privileges and Immunities Clause] did for the protection
of the citizens of one State against hostile and discriminating
legislation of other States, the fourteenth amendment does for the
protection of every citizen of the United States against hostile and
discriminating legislation against him in favor of others, whether
they reside in the same or in different States.198

Field notes that the Fourteenth Amendment places a baseline of
fundamental rights “under the guardianship of the National
authority,”199 and ensures federal judicial vindication.200 Field, like
Bingham and the consensus view Republicans, identifies an
irreducible minimum body of fundamental rights, which he believes
is partially set out in Corfield, but which certainly includes freedom
from monopolies. He further ties himself to the consensus view and
Republican constitutional theory by predicating his arguments on a
civic equality basis.201
196. Id. at 95–96. By positing that privileges or immunities in a state were relative to the
“the wisdom of its laws, the ability of its officers, the efficiency of its magistrates, the education
and morals of its people, and by many other considerations,” Field was not undoing his
argument. Rather, he was suggesting that all rights are relative and subject to regulation or
modification, as with registering voters or the exigent circumstances doctrine. Field clarified his
views on the police power (and reconciled any potential doubt that he espoused the consensus
view) in Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. 129, 137–41 (Field, J., concurring), where he explained
that states may regulate rights as they see fit, provided they do not “encroach upon any of the
just rights of the citizen, which the Constitution intended to guard against abridgment.” Id. at
138.
197. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 96–106.
198. Id. at 100–01.
199. Id. at 101.
200. Notably, Justice Field moves on to explain why monopolies were such a baleful
entity at common law, and how every citizen was entitled to protection against them. Id. at
102–04. In a sense, he has performed the very first Palko v. Connecticut inquiry, by testing the
constitutional adequacy of a state act against the traditions and principles inherent in AngloAmerican concepts of government. Citing Corfield, he looks at whether pursuit of a trade was
of the sort that “belong[s] of right to citizens of all free governments.” Id. at 97.
201. Id. at 88–89 (explaining that an arbitrary privilege for one group of persons for one
period of time could be extended to one person in perpetuity, and consequently the remaining
citizenry would be deprived of its rights); see also id. at 109–110 (“In all [his cited] cases there
is a recognition of the equality of right among citizens in the pursuit of the ordinary avocations
of life, and a declaration that all grants of exclusive privileges, in contravention of this equality,
are against common right, and void. This equality of right, with exemption from all
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3. The radical view
By its very name, the consensus view implies that it occupies a
middle position among three choices, as indeed it does. Not every
Republican was a moderate, and not every newspaper called for
restrained application of the Amendment. Radicals dominated the
rhetorical landscape in this era, such that one might predict that
Radical views would have been very relevant to historical queries, but
they were not.202 When modern revisionist scholars think of
privileges or immunities, it is likely that they are imagining the
Radical view, a view that understood the Amendments as conveying
a plenitude of political, social, and human rights.
One must note from the outset that this view by no means
predominated; it rather bounded discussions on one side the way the
narrow view bounded them on the other. To that end, the Radical
view is less common than the narrow, and certainly less common
than the consensus view. Yet it is no less relevant for its minority
status, in that it was a key element in debates over the Amendment,
and it offered a glimpse into what the nation’s intellectual and
philosophical leadership aimed at during this period.
Thaddeus Stevens, longtime Radical firebrand and Republican
leader, argued in favor of the Amendment as the best Congress
could do at the time. Notably, his language is more in keeping with
the Barnett-revisionist understanding of the Privileges Clause.
Consider his statement that he could “hardly believe that any person
can be found who will not admit that [the Amendment] is just. [Its
provisions] are all asserted, in some form or other, in our
DECLARATION or organic law.”203 The idea that the Declaration
should be given effect through the Constitution reappears in
Stevens’ statements during the ratification debates. He argued with
some force that the franchise was included in privileges or
immunities of citizens, challenging his listeners to “show me the man
who is so impudent as to deny that suffrage by the ballot is due to
every being within this realm to whom God has given

disparaging and partial enactments, in the lawful pursuits of life, throughout the whole
country, is the distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States.”).
202. As seen above, Fairman and Berger marginalized them, while Justice Miller ignores
their view in his ruling.
203. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2459 (1866).
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immortality.”204 He later posited that the Constitution of 1789 failed
in its attempt to “carry out the principles of government which were
intended by the fathers, when in 1776 they laid the foundation of
the government on which this nation was to be built.”205 At the time
of the Founding, Stevens says, the Framers had to postpone the
fulfillment of these rights, but now, “thank God that necessity no
longer exists.”206
Moreover, though a theory does not become valid by having
luminous devotees, prominent support does place the contemporary
debate in relief. To that end, Frederick Douglass believed that voting
and civil rights were part and parcel of the new freedom of blacks
and all citizens in general. In his “Appeal to Congress for Impartial
Suffrage” of 1867, he claims that voting rights are natural rights that
emanate from the manhood of the freed slaves.207 He made a
powerful claim against second-class citizenship as contrary to the
national honor and dignity, and notes that America could not
“afford to endure the moral blight which the existence of a degraded
and hated class must necessarily inflict upon any people among
whom such a class may exist. . . . [I]n a word, you stamp them as a
degraded caste . . . .”208 He is most prescient when he notes that a
“disfranchisement in a republican government based upon the idea
of human equality and universal suffrage . . . [has a] bitter and
stinging element of invidiousness.”209 Douglass saw the Southern
objections to the franchise and broader acceptance of civil rights

204. From Our Second Evening Edition of Yesterday, BOS. DAILY J., Nov. 1, 1867 (page
2), available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://www.library.nd.edu/
find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required). He explicitly ties this
right to the Privileges Clause. He suggested that “every citizen of any State is entitled to all the
inalienable rights, privileges and immunities of this Government, and . . . one of those
inalienable rights is the right to cast his ballot for every man who is to take part in the
Government.” Id.
205. Stevens, supra note 79.
206. Id.
207. Frederick Douglass, An Appeal to Congress for Impartial Suffrage, 19 ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Jan. 1867, at 112, available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers
http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password
required).
208. Id. at 114.
209. Id. at 115.
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under the Fourteenth Amendment for what they likely were: an
attempt to maintain the prewar social order.210
Reconstruction governments in the states also took a wide view
of privileges or immunities. A curious episode in Georgia’s
Reconstruction provides a good glimpse into the nature of the rights
Radicals thought were at stake. In 1868, the Georgia Assembly
complained of Radicals and carpetbaggers, and sought to reassert
control over the government.211 While asserting that it firmly
believed in the protection of all individual rights,212 the Legislature
inexplicably proceeded to expel all its black members.213 The
Springfield Daily Republican, another Massachusetts Republican
organ, was archetypical when it incredulously reproduced the
Georgian Legislature’s pledge of support for equality when it “ha[d]
just passed, or [was] going to pass, a law declaring the negroes
ineligible to office in Georgia!”214 Governor-General Bullock of
Georgia, in response to the Act expelling blacks from the legislature,
wrote the Federal Congress to say that Reconstruction was not
accomplished in Georgia.215 His annual message to the Legislature
says that only Congress can interpret the tone and meaning of the
Reconstruction Acts, and that “Congress will not pause in the great
work of regeneration until we fully acquiesce in the great fact that

210. Id. at 116. He continues, “[The South] will swallow all the unconstitutional test
oaths, repeal all the ordinances of Secession, repudiate the Rebel debt, promise to pay the debt
incurred in conquering its people, pass all the constitutional amendments, if only it can have
the negro left under its political control. The proposition is as modest as that made on the
mountain: All these things will I give unto thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
211. Times’ Special Dispatches: Georgia, NEW ORLEANS TIMES, Sept. 27, 1868 (page 1),
available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://www.library.nd.edu/
find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
212. See id. (“We assert that it is the purpose of the white people of this State to faithfully
protect the negro race in the enjoyment of all the rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed
him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the constitution and laws of this
State.”).
213. Republican State Convention, BOS. DAILY J., Sept. 9, 1868 (page 2), available at
America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.
shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
214. Review of the Week, SPRINGFIELD DAILY REPUBLICAN (Mass), Oct. 3, 1868 (page
1), available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://www.library.nd.edu/
find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
215. Affairs in the South, THE SUN (Balt.), Jan. 16, 1869 (page 1), available at America’s
Database of Historical Newspapers http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#
tab_news (username and password required).
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our late slaves are men, entitled to all the rights, privileges and
immunities of other men before the law.”216
Yet more was involved than political rights in these struggles.
The Daily Republican’s article also approvingly described Louisiana
Governor-General Warmoth’s veto of a “bill punishing
discriminations on account of color in hotels, on cars, &c. and the
veto [was] sustained by the Legislature.”217 Apparently, the “veto
[was] based on several reasons, one all sufficient one being that the
constitution clearly secures equal rights and privileges to the blacks,
which they are at liberty to enforce in the courts.”218 In other words,
Radicals believed the Constitution protected a fundamentally equal
society, both in the private and public sphere. One hears echoes of
this belief in both Justice Bradley’s and Justice Swayne’s dissents in
The Slaughter-House Cases.219
Other radicals promoted individual liberties as at the core of the
Privileges Clause, liberties that formed the basis of equal citizenship.
Republican, historian, and diplomat John Lothrop Motley declared
that the Constitution was a “pompous falsehood” until and unless
“the citizens of New England, or New York, or Pennsylvania, white,
black or yellow, are entitled to the privileges and immunities of
citizens in Alabama, or Texas, or any other State.”220 Senator James
Wilson told a crowd of African-Americans that “[b]efore the law you
are my equals and my peers, you have the same rights, privileges and
immunities that I possess. . . . [Y]ou are as free as I am, and are
entitled to vote.”221 One can only assume that Wilson believed he
had more social or human rights than the franchise. Feminists like

216. Id.
217. Review of the Week, supra note 214.
218. Id.
219. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 111–24 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting);
id. at 124–30 (Swayne, J., dissenting). These dissents deserve a fuller treatment than they will
receive in this paper, but it is enough to note that their view of privileges or immunities
extends beyond Justice Field’s consensus approach.
220. Four Questions for the People at the Presidential Election, BOS. DAILY J., Oct. 21,
1868 (page 5), available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://www
.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
221. Senator Wilson to the Colored Men, N.H. SENTINEL, April 18, 1867 (page 2); see also
The New Element in Kentucky Politics, supra note 158 (“[B]ut to-day we are—stupendous
change—an American citizen, entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the white man.”).
These sources are available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers
http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password
required).
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Elizabeth Cady Stanton demanded full civic and social equality for
women, and complained that “while every type and shade of
manhood is rejoicing to-day in all the rights, privileges, and
immunities of citizens in the District [of Columbia], its noblest
matrons are still living under the statute law of a dark and barbarous
age.”222
Republican papers promoted the Radical view in their pages. The
Harrisburg Weekly Patriot and Union forcefully argued that the
Privileges Clause included “the privileges of voting, of holding
office, of being a juryman, &c.; immunity from exclusion from
schools, hotels, public offices, conventions, &c. The corollary is to
meet the case of the slaves just emancipated.”223 Former Attorney
General George Hoar embraced the Radical view to a degree that
would not become mainstream until the late twentieth century.224
The (ever Radical) Cincinnati Daily Gazette quotes Hoar as
believing “privileges and immunities” to include the pursuit of

222. Woman Suffrage—Mrs. Stanton Before the Senate Committee, THE SUN (Balt.), Jan.
30, 1869 (page 1). Indeed, suffragettes and other feminists had lobbied both parties for
political and social rights. On one occasion, Susan B. Anthony had petitioned the Democratic
National Convention to agree to women’s suffrage and other rights, and noted that recent
moves by Republicans had “roused us to more earnest and persistent efforts to secure these
rights, privileges and immunities that belong to every citizen under the Government.” The
National Democratic Convention Second Day, BOS. DAILY J., July 7, 1868 (page 1). She also
pointed out that blacks had been elevated to citizenship (which prompted hisses from
Democrats) and described the nature of their rights: suffrage, taxation with representation,
juries of peers, government by consent, possession of the “honor and dignity” of citizens. Id.
In what would presage a later coalition of progressives, labor unions joined the chorus for
greater rights (though not for women), professing in 1869 their belief that all freedmen were
“equal in political right, and entitled to the largest liberty consistent with good government;
no persons or classes are entitled to exclusive privileges and immunities.” See The Labor
Congress, CIN. DAILY GAZETTE, Aug. 21, 1869 (page 3). All sources quoted in this footnote
are available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://www.library.nd.edu/
find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
223. Negro Suffrage to be “Snaked” upon the People Through the Rump Amendment, and
Enforced by the Supreme Court, supra note 149, at 4, available at America’s Database of
Historical
Newspapers
http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news
(username and password required).
224. Hoar, when in the House in 1871, believed that privileges or immunities meant “‘all
the privileges and immunities declared to belong to the citizen by the Constitution itself’
together with ‘those privileges and immunities which all Republican writers of authority agree
in declaring fundamental and essential to citizenship.’” CURTIS, supra note 3, at 162 (quoting
CONG. GLOBE, 42D CONG., 1ST SESS. 334 (1871)). In other words, the Radical view accepts
all Republican equality notions in the consensus view and adds to them social rights.
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happiness.225 To that end, the paper editorializes that marriage
between races must be included in the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, because marriage is a pursuit of happiness, which is a
privilege of citizenship.226
The Radical view, then, accepted privileges or immunities as
embodying the litany of fundamental rights of Englishmen and
Americans, the Bill of Rights, social and civic equality, and a robust
application of the principles of the Declaration of Independence. It
should be no surprise that revisionists find much to commend in this
view; nor should it be a surprise that libertarians like Randy Barnett
approve of the Radical view, as it imposes on states the sort of limits
that they believe the Ninth Amendment enforces against the federal
government.227 As appealing as this view may be, it simply was not
widely held enough to constitute a viable reading of the public
understanding of the Privileges Clause between 1866 and 1872. If
nothing else, the Radical view shows what Radical Republicans
offered in response to the narrow view, and what the moderates of
the consensus view had to recognize as the belief and desire of a
powerful political minority. In this, it clarifies the political
environment of those six years, and helps develop a more accurate
appreciation of the public understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment; or rather, what that understanding was until the
Supreme Court imposed the narrow view upon the nation in The
Slaughter-House Cases.
IV. NEW OPPORTUNITIES
After The Slaughter-House Cases, the Privileges Clause became a
nearly dead letter. The Court eviscerated any remaining usefulness
for the Clause just three years later in United States v. Cruikshank.228
When a group of African-Americans assembled around the Colfax,
Louisiana courthouse to prevent Democrats from seizing control, a
mob of armed whites attacked, killing many dozens.229 Cruikshank,

225. Marriage Between Whites and Blacks, CIN. DAILY GAZETTE, May 19, 1870 (page 2),
available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers http://www.library.nd.edu/
find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password required).
226. Id.
227. Barnett, supra note 54, at 9.
228. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
229. Anarchy Again in Louisiana: A War of Races in Grant Parish, HARTFORD
COURANT, Apr. 16, 1873 (page 3), available at America’s Database of Historical Newspapers
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one of the leaders of the white mob, and his cohort were charged
with violating the Enforcement Act, which forbade “band[ing] or
conspi[ring] together . . . to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and
enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the
constitution or laws of the United States.”230 The charge
presupposed that the murdered freedmen were attempting to
exercise their rights to assembly and the right to bear arms—the
freedmen had their weapons seized, rendering them helpless.
Although initially convicted, the Supreme Court reversed,
determining that none of the charges under the Enforcement Act
were valid.231 The Fourteenth Amendment, the Court reasoned,
protected
persons
against
invidious
discrimination
and
unconstitutional action by state government.232 Had the Court
disposed of the case in this way, it may have worked little
constitutional harm: after all, the Fourteenth Amendment does not
proscribe non-state conduct in the same way that the Thirteenth
Amendment does. But Chief Justice Waite went much farther than a
simple textual analysis, and completed the work begun in The
Slaughter-House Cases. Waite explained that even if there had been
state action in Cruikshank, the convictions still could not have stood
because the mob had not deprived anyone of a “right or privilege
granted or secured . . . by the constitution or laws of the United
States.”233
This jurisprudential feat required a hypertechnical reading of the
facts and some linguistic contortion. For example, Waite wrote that
the First Amendment protects “the right of the people to assemble
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”234 Waite
omits a crucial comma; the text of the Amendment actually protects
“the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the

http://www.library.nd.edu/find_articles/index.shtml#tab_news (username and password
required).
230. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548 (citing Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 6,
16 Stat. 141).
231. Id. at 559.
232. Id. at 554 (“The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of
one citizen as against another.”).
233. Id. at 551–56.
234. Id. at 552 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
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Government for a redress of grievances.”235 By omitting the split
between the assembly clause and the petition clause, Waite makes it
seem that the First Amendment only protects lawful assemblies for
the purpose of petitioning the government:
The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right
on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.
If it had been alleged in these counts that the object of the
defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the case
would have been within the statute, and within the scope of the
sovereignty of the United States. Such, however, is not the case.
The offence, as stated in the indictment, will be made out, if it be
shown that the object of the conspiracy was to prevent a meeting
for any lawful purpose whatever.236

The Court ignored the possibility that peaceable assembly for any
purpose was probably within the ambit of the First Amendment’s
protections. The Second Amendment receives similarly short shrift.
Bearing arms, the Court reasoned, was a right that predated the
Constitution and was therefore not created by the Second
Amendment, nor was possession of weapons for a “lawful purpose” a
right first established by the Amendment.237 The amendments are
merely limits on Congress’s authority to legislate: the Fourteenth
Amendment did not work any change to Barron v. Baltimore or the
notion that the states chose the scope of rights within their
jurisdiction.238
The Cruikshank Court, which rejected even the modest idea that
the Bill of Rights applied to the states after the Fourteenth
Amendment, issued the final word on privileges or immunities for
generations. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent in Saenz
v. Roe, the Privileges Clause was applied once with approval between

235. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
236. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552–53.
237. Id. at 553.
238. Id. at 553–54 (“The very highest duty of the States, when they entered into the
Union under the Constitution, was to protect all persons within their boundaries in the
enjoyment of these ‘unalienable rights with which they were endowed by their Creator.’
Sovereignty, for this purpose, rests alone with the States. It is no more the duty or within the
power of the United States to punish for a conspiracy to falsely imprison or murder within a
State, than it would be to punish for false imprisonment or murder itself.”).
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its passage and 1999.239 Given the limitations imposed by The
Slaughter-House Cases and Cruikshank, this dormancy is
unsurprising. Only in the recent debate on the Second Amendment
did the Clause appear to have a chance at revitalization. After the
Supreme Court concluded that the Second Amendment protected
private firearm ownership against federal intrusion,240 the logical next
question was whether states were similarly barred from banning
handguns. The heavy restrictions placed on handgun ownership in
Chicago offered the chance to resolve the issue of whether the
Privileges Clause could have new use.
A. McDonald and Revisionism
When McDonald v. City of Chicago241 came before the Supreme
Court, commentators and jurists—whose thoughts were leavened by
the revisionist school and works like Curtis’s No State Shall
Abridge—debated the Privileges Clause as a source of constitutional
rights.242 Chicago’s Municipal Code all but forbade citizens from
owning or possessing handguns within the city limits.243 Although
Heller couched the right to personal firearm ownership in the
language of substantive due process,244 the principal and major
amicus briefs in McDonald devoted dozens of pages to an analysis of
the Privileges Clause and skirted the Due Process Clause.245 In the
months leading up to oral arguments, speculation ran that the Court
was poised to make a profound statement about privileges or
immunities.246
239. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 511 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), overruled by Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83
(1940)).
240. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (concluding that private firearm
ownership was constitutionally protected under the Second Amendment).
241. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
242. Id.
243. See id. at 3026 (“A City ordinance provides that ‘[n]o person shall . . . possess . . .
any firearm unless such person is the holder of a valid registration certificate for such firearm.’ .
. . The Code then prohibits registration of most handguns, thus effectively banning handgun
possession by almost all private citizens who reside in the City.”) (citations omitted).
244. Id. at 3042 (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental
rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”).
245. See, e.g., supra note 11.
th
246. Timothy Sandefur, Revive Privileges or Immunities: 14 Amendment Clause Ought to
Protect Against State Red Tape Limiting Economic Freedom, NAT’L L.J. (March 01, 2010),

491

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/3/2011 1:14 PM

2011

The Court did indeed make such a profound statement. As Alan
Gura, lead counsel for the petitioners in McDonald began his
argument, Chief Justice Roberts stated that any argument based on
the Privileges Clause was “contrary to the Slaughter-House cases,
which have been the law for 140 years” and that it would be a
“heavy burden for [Petitioner] to carry to suggest that [the Court]
ought to overrule that decision.”247 Justice Scalia, after securing from
Gura an admission that it would be “easier” to resolve the case per
the Due Process Clause, explained that while a revitalized Privileges
Clause is the “darling of the professoriate, for sure, . . . it’s also
contrary to 140 years of our jurisprudence.”248 Scalia went on to ask
why the petitioners wanted “to undertake that burden instead of just
arguing substantive due process, which as much as I think it’s wrong,
I have—even I have acquiesced in it?”249
Despite this unpromising opening, the Justices did discuss
privileges or immunities. Throughout the argument, the influence of
the revisionist school was apparent. That is, the questions for counsel
were littered with references to “natural rights” and unenumerated
rights in the mode of Professor Barnett.250 Justice Ginsburg explored
the definitional problem that goes along with any concept of
privileges or immunities that went beyond the first eight
amendments. If the Privileges Clause secured rights that are implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty, then those rights are coterminous
with rights that are protected by substantive due process. If the
Clause protects natural rights, as revisionists argue, then it is almost
impossible to adjudicate cases without adopting a dramatically
libertarian view of the Constitution. If the Clause protects something
else, what is it?251
These interpretive problems should be familiar: they are the same
issues that have arisen since the drafting of the Privileges Clause.
Accordingly, the Court skirted the issue, with Justice Alito

http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202444559409&Revive_privileges_or_
immunities&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.
247. Transcript of Oral Argument at *2, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020
(2010) (No. 08-1521).
248. Id. at *5.
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., id. at *3–4, *7 (“Justice Ginsburg: What unenumerated rights would we
be declaring privileges and immunities under your conception of it?”).
251. See id. at *9–10.
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dismissing outright the possibility of a revived Privileges Clause.252
Justice Thomas offered a new interpretation—or rather, an old
interpretation that seems new.
1. Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion
Although the Privileges Clause did not feature prominently in
the majority or the dissents in McDonald,253 Justice Thomas broke
with the other eight Justices to thoroughly examine the Clause. In
fact, he based his concurrence upon it, something all but unknown
in the Court since The Slaughter-House Cases. Thomas opened by
stating his belief that “the right to keep and bear arms is a privilege
of American citizenship that applies to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.”254 Much
ink will no doubt be spilled discussing the legal conclusions and
interpretive consequences of Justice Thomas’s concurrence. My
intent is not to dissect his argument, because I agree substantially
with Justice Thomas’s position. My conclusion, however, is driven
by different considerations, supported by different sources, and
compels a slightly different result.
Justice Thomas conducts a standard originalist inquiry as the
basis for his opinion. He begins by placing the Fourteenth
Amendment in political and social context. Describing the
splintering of the nation over slavery and the bloodshed of the Civil
War, he argued that the postwar amendments “were adopted to
repair the nation from the damage slavery had caused.”255 Then,
laying out a critique of substantive due process,256 Justice Thomas
252. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3048.
253. Id. at 3089 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing petitioners’ argument on the
Privileges Clause and agreeing “with the plurality's refusal to accept petitioners' primary
submission”); id. at 3132 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court today properly declines to
revisit our interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.”).
254. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring).
255. Id. at 3060.
256. Id. at 3061–63. Originalists often level criticism at the idea of “substantive due
process,” contending that it is a doctrine without an origin in constitutional text. And, in fact,
reduced to their simplest form, substantive due process cases are exercises in judicial
incredulity—they turn on whether a court’s reaction to a legislative choice is, essentially, a
statement that “no reasonable legislature could possibly have reached X or Y conclusion.” Laws
that violate substantive due process are overruled because they offend a “deeply rooted
tradition or principle of ordered liberty.” But because there is no objective way to decide what
rights are fundamental, judicial review is little more than a litmus test on whether a law “seems
right.” For this reason, critics of all stripes are unhappy with substantive due process's
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posits that the McDonald was an opportunity for the Court “to
reexamine, and begin the process of restoring, the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment agreed upon by those who ratified it.”257
This restoration takes the form of an etymological study of
“privileges or immunities” and then an examination of contemporary
documents, primarily what can be called “elite” sources: members of
Congress and legal scholars. The concurrence describes Justice
Washington’s list of rights in Corfield258 and the thoughts of
prominent legal thinkers like Kent and Cooley.259 Turning to the
records from the 39th Congress, Thomas outlines the thoughts of
congressional leaders like Bingham260 and Sen. Jacob Howard,261 and
the forceful objections of Representative Hale of New York.262 “As a
whole,” Justice Thomas asserts, “these well-circulated speeches
indicate that § 1 was understood to enforce constitutionally declared
rights against the States, and they provide no suggestion that any
language in the section other than the Privileges or Immunities
Clause would accomplish that task.”
Thomas continues this survey of sources by recounting more
speeches in Congress, describing legislation passed by the Radical
Republicans, citing decisions by Circuit judges, and outlining the
considered opinions of more leading legal thinkers.263 With one
exception,264 Justice Thomas relies on these elite sources as the basis
for his conclusion that the “evidence plainly shows that the ratifying
scattershot and unpredictable results. The frustration the dissents voice in McDonald at the
incorporation of the Second Amendment via substantive due process resembles the frustration
of other Justices in other substantive due process cases.
257. Id. at 3063.
258. Id. at 3067 (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825)
(No. 3230)).
259. Id. at 3067–68 (quoting COOLEY, supra note 60, at 15, 16 & n.3 (reprint 1972)
(1868); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 35 (11th ed. 1867)).
260. Id. at 3072.
261. Id. at 3073–74 (quoting Howard’s remarks that the Constitution recognized “‘a
mass of privileges, immunities, and rights, some of them secured by the second section of the
fourth article of the Constitution . . . some by the first eight amendments of the Constitution,’
and that ‘there is no power given in the Constitution to enforce and to carry out any of these
guarantees’ against the States”).
262. Id. at 3073; see also supra note 92 and accompanying text.
263. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3075–77 (Thomas, J., concurring).
264. Thomas cites one article that collects certain newspaper articles, some of which
reflect public comments from a non-elite perspective. See David T. Hardy, Original Popular
Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment as Reflected in the Print Media of 1866–1868, 30
WHITTIER. L. REV. 695 (2009).
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public understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect
constitutionally enumerated rights, including the right to keep and
bear arms.”265
While the decision to use these sources does not undermine
Justice Thomas’s argument, it deprives his contentions of some
force. To begin, elite-source historiography comes close to “original
intent” originalism, a theory most jurists and scholars reject as an
interpretive methodology.266 Privileging elite sources over a wider
array of contemporary documents leaves judges with a limited body
of evidence with which to make a decision: an ill-advised decision
when originalists already suffer from a lack of reliable sources to
begin with.267 A better course, although a more time-consuming
one,268 is to use the widest array of sources.
Contextualizing Justice Thomas’s arguments amid the spectrum
of public comment around 1868 places his concurrence somewhere
near the consensus view. But his methodology is tied to the
revisionist school, and, in a more fulsome way, to the Framers’ views
on natural rights. One important aspect of his discussion is the
emphasis on historical and contemporary practice: firearms were an
important part of life for millions—and because they were so
common, ownership must have been understood to be a
fundamental right, and vice versa.
But as the evidence in Part III suggests, natural rights and
unenumerated privileges were apparently far from the minds of the
drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Little public
comment touched upon the natural right to firearms, or the fact that
the Bill of Rights merely codified a preexisting set of rights. In fact,
the Supreme Court’s opinions in Cruikshank and The
Slaughter-House Cases—with their discussion of natural rights—were
rare exceptions to the rule that citizenship rights were the primary

265. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3077 (Thomas, J., concurring).
266. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism, 3 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 325, 327 nn.5–6 (2009) (“Most academic originalists insist that . . . the original
public meaning of the Constitution[] is the relevant object of interpretation because the
Constitution became legally binding through the actions of its ratifiers, not its framers.”).
267. Opponents of the use of legislative history should also be hesitant to rely only on
elite sources like the Congressional Record.
268. This consideration is not insignificant, given the time-consuming nature of historical
research and the incredibly crowded federal docket.
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concern of the day.269 Discussions about the substantive guarantees
of the Bill of Rights and about political citizenship were far more
important to the national conversation on the Amendment.270
The originalist inquiry in Justice Thomas’s concurrence, then,
mirrors the simultaneously too broad/too narrow nature of the
revisionist school. While he rightly notes that the original
understanding of the Privileges Clause applied the Bill of Rights
against the states, his emphasis on the nature of the right to firearm
ownership as an inalienable right that predates the Constitution is
somewhat outside the scope of public understanding at the time. In
other words, Justice Thomas’s concurrence is a fair reading of the
original meaning, but a somewhat incomplete one. The broader
public’s understanding of the Privileges Clause should inform the
discussion more fully, and should frame originalists’ discourse in the
future.
V. WHOSE CONSTITUTION IS IT, ANYWAY?
The debates over the Fourteenth Amendment are not likely to
abate, even in the face of overwhelming evidence one way or the
other. The stakes are too high, given the extensive nature of the Due
Process Clause’s “liberty” rights and the political sensitivity that
attends those rights. But due process was just about the last thing on
anyone’s mind in 1866—all the public and the politicians could
discuss were privileges or immunities.
In that sense, an originalist who focuses on due process has
missed the point of the Amendment almost in its entirety. The
sources show such a powerful devotion to the three views among
their adherents that the only fair answer to what Section 1 means
must begin there, in the midst of the kind of spirited public debate
we lament not having today. The great irony of this episode in
American history is that Southerners and the Supreme Court did
more to preserve antebellum states’ rights and federalism in the four

269. Perhaps because unenumerated rights are undefined and malleable, it was easier for
the Court to use them as the basis for a wholesale rejection of a more defined set of rights.
270. One of the dangers of originalist opinion-writing, as with any historical exercise, is
answering the wrong question. Describing the public’s understanding of firearm ownership is a
helpful tool when conducting a Palko-style “deeply rooted tradition” test. But the stronger
inquiry (and, incidentally, the inquiry with far more source materials) in McDonald was
whether the public understood the Privileges Clause to apply the Bill of Rights to the states,
and not whether firearm ownership was a privilege of American citizenship.
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years between ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
decision in The Slaughter-House Cases than the armies of the
Confederacy did in the four years of the Civil War. The triumph of
the narrow view and its ossification in legal scholarship deprived the
citizens of the several states of a body of privileges or immunities to
which they were entitled.
But what were those rights? The available sources bear out the
assertion that, at the very least, the consensus view was the original
public understanding of the Privileges Clause. One may accept the
Radical view and the revisionist story, but only at some peril. While
modern scholars may like the notion of a vast, unenumerated body
of rights embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment, it does not
appear as though the drafters and ratifiers of that provision believed
it existed.
Bearing that in mind, it is important to note also that revitalizing
the consensus view would not be without consequences, a fact that
applies a fortiori for revivifying the Radical view. Citizenship rights
are emphatically not liberty rights as we understand them.271 The
consensus view of the Privileges Clause would not necessarily protect
privacy rights, but it would have voided generations of
discriminatory state political practices. More relevant to modern
readers, the consensus view of the Clause might not require states to
recognize gay marriages, but it would have forbidden them from
creating second class legal status for minorities—that is, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger272 might not be the correct reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but neither is Plessy v. Ferguson.273 Modern
jurisprudence would be different, and would likely lean towards
greater state autonomy, which would be consistent with republican
intent and contemporary understanding.
Accepting the original public understanding as laid out above
does not necessarily require courts to undo the last forty (or even
one hundred and forty) years’ precedents. Originalists—including
“progressive originalists”274—may well find the radical view the most
271. In effect, liberty interests would probably be pared down to what we now call
“procedural due process.”
272. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (invalidating California ballot measure and
concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment compels states to recognize same-sex marriage).
273. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
274. See Bravin, supra note 8, at A12 (“So-called progressive originalism departs from the
conservative strain by shifting focus from the 18th-century constitutional text to the three
Reconstruction amendments ratified after the Civil War. . . . By applying methods blessed by
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compelling understanding of the Privileges Clause. A robust
antidiscrimination power coupled with a textual guarantee for facial
challenges would certainly provide means to broadly define personal
rights, despite relatively weaker protection under the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses.275 Other critics might posit that
substantive due process has developed into an important source of
individual rights in the United States, and that stare decisis might
compel its preservation even in the face of overwhelming evidence
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not understand “process” to
encompass “substance.”276 And, of course, one might reject
originalism as a legal tool altogether, or at least one might reject
giving historical evidence dispositive weight in assessing a case.
On the other hand, accepting the consensus view does require
the rejection of many decisions, including, of course, The
Slaughter-House Cases. It also probably necessitates scrapping the
selective incorporation doctrine and the application of Supreme
Court case law on the amendments against the states—although not
completely. Duncan v. Louisiana requires the states to apply
Supreme Court decisions on the provisions of the Bill of Rights
incorporated by the Due Process Clause.277 But if the first eight
Amendments were incorporated whole-cloth, as Justice Black’s
dissent in Adamson argued and as the contemporary public
discussion suggests,278 then the states may be entitled to interpret

conservatives to the neglected texts and forgotten framers of the Reconstruction amendments,
liberals hope to deploy powerful new arguments to cement precedents under threat from the
right and undergird the recognition of new rights.”).
275. Admittedly, these personal rights are only guaranteed to all citizens if a state
guarantees them to some of its citizens. Thus, a state could foreseeably restrict some rights even
under the Radical view’s antidiscrimination principle, so long as the restriction applied to all
citizens. For example, consider Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). In Palmer, the city
of Jackson, Mississippi decided to close, rather than integrate, a public swimming pool. The
Court held that this decision did not violate the Equal Protection Clause: all citizens of all
races were deprived of the benefit of the pool. Just as the decision to close the pool did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause, the closure would probably not violate the Privileges
Clause (unless public swimming pools are a privilege of national citizenship), because there is
no discrimination among the citizenry. In the end, such cases would be resolved by resort to
the political process and selecting new legislators.
276. As demonstrated in the McDonald oral arguments, even vociferous critics of
substantive due process like Justice Scalia recognize the doctrine’s importance and likely
staying power in our jurisprudence. See supra notes 248–249 and accompanying text.
277. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
278. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68–92 (1947) (Black, J., Dissenting), overruled
in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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them as they see fit, though with federal court supervision of the
lower boundary of those rights. The contours of the rights in the
first eight Amendments would thus be left to the states to ascertain,
but Congress and the courts would ensure federal protection of a
baseline of personal rights. Such a system would neatly match
Bingham’s understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment as an
enforcement mechanism for the Bill of Rights and with the public’s
understanding of the balance between police power and federal
authority. That each state might have different protections for
speech, religious exercise, or privacy would not have been surprising
to Americans in 1868: each state did have different rights, privileges,
and immunities already. The Fourteenth Amendment, as understood
at the time, did not abolish all of these differences. Instead, it
forbade states from denying its citizens some rights that inhered to
all Americans
Regardless of changes to the law today, there is a final reason to
apply the Privileges Clause as it was understood: legitimacy. The
drafters of the Amendment fought actual, as well as political, battles
to achieve its passage and application. The citizens who ratified it
thought they were altering the organic law of the Republic, and
modern courts ought not to deprive them of their historical agency
simply because society has grown accustomed to our precedents—
which are unwieldy and too malleable as it is. The solution to the
Gordian complexity of our private rights jurisprudence may lie in the
restoration of the elegant and original understanding of the
Privileges Clause.
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